The Supreme Court has sought response of the Registrar Generals of all High Courts on a petition seeking direction to the states to establish ‘Gram Nyayalayas’ as per the Gram Nyayalayas Act 2008.

The Bench of Justice S. Abdul Nazeer and Justice V. Ramasubramanian directed to add all High Courts as respondents in the case, after noting that their presence was necessary for adjudicating the matter.

The order was passed on a PIL filed by the National Federation of Societies for Fast Justice seeking the implementation of the Gram Nyayalayas Act.

Representing the petitioner, Advocate Prashant Bhushan contended that though the Act was passed almost 14 years ago, many States have not established even a single Gram Nyayalayas. 

Bhushan said the Act had proposed establishment of village courts, which would not be bound by the rigid procedure of CPC and CrPC to decide the small cases of specified nature.

The Counsel said the Central government had noted that the establishment of Gram Nyayalayas by the States was not mandatory as the Act used the word ‘may’ instead of ‘shall’.

He further said that the Court has interpreted ‘may’ to mean ‘shall’ in certain situations. Since access to justice was a fundamental right, may should be interpreted as shall in the context of Gram Nyayalayas, added Bhushan.

He pointed out that more than 50 percent of the population in the country were not able to afford lawyers and approach regular courts. This was the reason for enacting the courts at village level for fast adjudication of small cases.

As per Bhushan, only a few states had implemented the Act, which included Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Kerala.

He said the government of Himachal Pradesh had opposed the establishment of Gram Nyayalayas, despite recommendation made by the High Court in this regard. Besides, the States of Bihar and Jharkhand were also opposing the Act, while the state of Tamil Nadu was yet to establish a single Gram Nyayalaya.

(Case title: National Federation of Societies for Fast Justice versus Union of India and others)

A new five-Judge Constitution Bench has been constituted in the Supreme Court, which will hear cases pending before the Apex Court for a long time. 

This will be the fourth Constitution bench of the Supreme Court. The other three Benches are led by Chief Justice (CJI) U.U. Lalit, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice S.K. Kaul. 

There was another Constitution Bench led by Justice Indira Banerjee, which was dissolved following her retirement last week. This takes the number of Constitution Benches formed so far during the term of CJI Lalit to five.

The new bench will comprise Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, Justice B.R. Gavai, Justice A.S. Bopanna, Justice V. Ramasubramanian and Justice B.V. Nagarathna.

During its first sitting on Wednesday, the fourth Constitution Bench will hear five matters, which are as under:

1. Petitions challenging the decision of the Union of India to demonetise the currency notes of Rs 500 and Rs 1000. (Vivek Narayan Sharma vs Union of India  and 57 connected cases)

2. Can restrictions be imposed on the fundamental right to freedom of speech exercised by Ministers? (Kaushal Kishor vs The State of Uttar Pradesh Govt. of UP Home Secretary with 1 connected matter) 

3. Does Article 105/194 (2) of the Constitution confer any immunity on the Members of Parliament/Legislative Assembly from being prosecuted for an offence involving offer or acceptance of bribe to cast vote in a legislature? (Sita Soren vs Union Of India)

4. Powers under Section 319 of the CrPC (Sukhpal Singh Khaira vs The State Of Punjab with 2 connected matters) 

5. Questions related to the Prevention of Corruption Act (Neeraj Dutta vs State)

The Supreme Court in its order held that in order to attract the offence of cheating (420 IPC) and Criminal Breach of Trust, the complainant is required to prove that the prima facie had an intention on its part to cheat him or to do fraud with him right from inception. 

A Division Bench of Justice S. Abdul Nazeer and Justice Krishna Murari delivered the judgement in favour of Vijay Kumar Ghai, stating that it has to be prima facie established from the complainant side that such alleged act of cheating, the complainant had suffered a wrongful loss and same had resulted in wrongful gain for accused/Petitioner Vijay Kumar Ghai.

“In absence of these elements, no proceeding is permissible in the eyes of law with regard to the commission of the offence punishable u/s 420 IPC,” held by the Bench of the Apex court. 

The name of the complainant is K. Adil, who is Authorised Representative of SMC Global Securities Ltd.

The apex court reached to the conclusion while allowing the petition of Vijay Kumar Ghai, Managing Director of Priknit Retails Ltd and of other Directors Mohit Ghai and Balwant Rai Bhalla that the complaint was filed at a belated stage – after a delay of four years, with the objective of causing harassment to them.

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The apex court set aside the Calcutta High Court order dated 1.10.2019 wherein the High Court had dismissed the quashing petition of Vijay Kumar Ghai Managing Director of Priknit Retails Ltd., Mohit Ghai qua Whole Time Director and of Balwant Rai Bhalla,quaDirector, after holding the observations that ‘continuance of criminal proceedings against the present appellant/accused Vijay Kumar Ghai, MD and other directors would not be an abuse of the process of the court’.

The Operative portion of the High court judgment read as :

“In the present case, the allegation in the FIR disclosed the offences alleged. Moreover, the allegations made in the FIR disclosed that the petitioner induced the complainant to purchase share or invest money by wilful misrepresentation. It is true that the complaint discloses that there was a commercial transaction between the parties but at the same time, it cannot be overlooked that the averments made in the complaint/FIR prima facie revel the commission of a cognizable offence.”

The apex court referred the judgment of Krishna Lal Chawla v St. of U.P. and ANR ,passed by two judges bench ,which further held that multiple complaints by same party against same accused in relation to same incident is not impermissible. 

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER VIJAY AND ORS : –

Sr. counsel, Menaka Guruswamy opposed the practise of forum shopping, which in this case was done by respondent no. 2 by filing 2 different complaints i.e. one at Delhi and one at Kolkata. The contentions were that allegations in FIR were purely of civil nature, but respondent no. 2 has given cloak of criminal colour. It was further submitted that there are no allegations in the complaint filed by the Respondent No. 2 about the Appellants having fraudulent or dishonest intentions at the time of making the representation.

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LEGAL ARGUMENTS OF THE COUNSEL OF RESPONDENTS K.ADIL, PRIKNIT RETAILS LTD. AND WEST BENGAL GOVT

Reliance place upon judgment of the apex court i.e. K. Jagadish Vs. Udaya Kumar G.S. & Anr setting out the established proposition of law that two complaints can co existsimultaneously if the scope of two complaints are different.

ARGUMENTS ON FACTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS K.ADIL, PRIKNIT RETAILS LTD. AND WEST BENGAL GOVT – 

Senior advocate appearing on behalf of the Respondents has vehemently submitted that the allegations contained in the complaint disclosed all the ingredients of the alleged offences and moreover, the criminal proceedings have not been initiated with mala fide intention and that the complaint case filed before the magistrate of Tis Hazari Court was not decided on merit and as such the complainant cannot be barred from making a fresh complaint.

Secondly, on fact, she argued that complainant made a specific allegation that on inducement of the accused persons, he had parted with 2.50 crore on a false promise that they would be allotted shares in the company. On 29.02.2008, a false statement was made by the accused persons that the complainant had been allotted the shares, whereas it transpired that the resolution about the allotment of shares was taken only on 23.03.2009 that is one year later.

FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE :– 

The background of the case is that K. Adil, Authorised Representative of SMC Global Securities Ltd, Delhi shown interest in investment on behalf of Vijay Kumar Ghaiand other Directors. It was mutually decided that K. Adil will invest amount of Rs. 2.5 crores with the company in lieu of which they will be issued 2,50,000 equity shares of Priknit Apparel Pvt. Ltd.  K. Adil filed their share application form along with the cheque of Rs. 2.5 crore.

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Subsequently, an allotment letter dated 29.03.2008 was issued in favour of Respondent No. 2 whereby 2,50,000 shares were issued in lieu of the investment made by him. The proforma respondent no. 3 company and Respondent No. 2 arrived at an understanding, regarding the investment made by Respondent No. 2.

Having failed to bring the I.P.O as per memorandum of understanding dated 20.08.2009, Respondent No. 2 issued a legal notice dated 06.12.2011 to the Appellants.

K.Adil, respondent no. 2 filed a police complaint on 06.01.2012, with PS RajenderNagar, New Delhi therefore her received response from concerned PS that the complaint filed is out of their territorial jurisdiction and ought to be transferred. On 11.04.2012, K.Adil filed a complaint with the Economic Offences Wing (hereinafter referred to as “EOW”) and the said complaint was transferred to PS Darya Ganj, New Delhi. 

That on 06.06.2012, K. Adil filed a complaint being CC No. 306/1/12 under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C before the TizHazari Court, New Delhi for registration of FIR against the Appellants and their company. On 01.09.2012, K. Adil also filed another Complaint No. 190 of 12 3 before Tis Hazari Court, New Delhi under Section 68 of the Companies Act read with Section 200 of Cr.P.C which is pending adjudication. 

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Moreover, MM of Tis Hazari Court vide order dated 28.02.2013 observed that the entire dispute raised by K.Adil, respondent no.2 was civil in nature and found no nature of criminality thus instead of registering FIR, posted case for pre-summoning evidence with regard to the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C filed by Respondent No.2.

Soon thereafter, K.Adil, preferred a second complaint under Section 406, 409, 420, 468,120B and 34 IPC on the basis of the same cause of action with the PS Bowbazarat Kolkata, West Bengal and the same was converted into an FIR bearing No. 168 under Section 406, 420, 120B IPC. 

Closure report was filed since entire dispute found to be civil in nature. Protest petition of K.Adil was allowed by CJM and directed for further investigation. 

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vide order dated 14.02.2017, the CMM, Calcutta took cognizance of the offence under Section 406, 420, 120B IPC against Managing Director, Whole time Director and director (Qua Petitioners). Against which, Petitioner preferred quashing petition under section 482 CrPC.

The Supreme Court heard a plea of Balmukund Tiwari, father of Roshni Tiwari as he was directed by the High Court of Allahabad to deposit Rs 10 lakh by Demand Drafts in two installments to her daughter as maintenance. 

The two-Judge Bench of Justice S. Abdul Nazeer and Justice Krishna Murari issued notice, subject to the condition on the payment of Rs three lakh before the trial court and further stayed the execution petition filed by Roshni Tiwari before the civil court.

Advocate Zahid Ali appeared for petitioner Balmukund Tiwari, father of respondent Roshni Tiwari. He submitted before the bench the judgment of ‘Rajneesh v. Neha and Anr’ passed by the apex court on payment of interim maintenance and covering other aspects related to maintenance.

To which, J. Nazeer submits – First, we will hear the facts of the case and later the judgment that was referred.

J. Nazeer submits – You are bound to give maintenance, it’s in the statutory provision of the Act.

Further Petitioner Balmukund Tiwari referred to prayer of the application of Roshni Tiwari seeking expenses towards performance of her marriage from her father under the statute. The counsel Zahid ali also mentioned about the order passed by the Allahabad High Court that the court has directed to pay 10 lacs as an marriage expense. 

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J. Nazeer submits that Roshni Tiwari is not pressing her application for maintenance. 

J. Nazeer submits- You deposit 5 lacs, we will issue notice then. You take whatever time you need.

Petitioner Balmukund submits – Something lesser than 5 lacs, my lord.

The Division bench of J. Sunita Agarwal and J. Krishan Pahal set aside the order passed by Family Court observing the fact that demand of Rs. 10 Lacs towards marriage expenses in the current scenario when the appellant is aged about 27-28 years cannot be said to unjustified. 

On the maintainability of application of Roshni Tiwari, the High Court conjointly read section 3(b) and section 20(3) of Act, 1956 an unmarried daughter is entitled for maintenance from her parents till she is unmarried, in case, she is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property. 

The maintenance includes reasonable expenses and incident to her marriage apart from food, clothing, residence, education and medical attendance and treatment. The obligation cast under Section 20 of the Act, 1956 is on both the parents, as observed by J. Krishan Pahal and J. Sunita Aggarwal of Allahabad High Court.

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Another finding of the High court was that family court while rejecting the application u/s 20(3) of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act,1956, simply ignored the fact that Roshni Tiwari had incurred all expenditures onwards her education, inpursuing nursing course and at no point of time, during the entire period, till and after she attained majority, her education and living expenses were borne by the father. Also , Roshani Tiwari had right to claim expenses towards performance of her marriage from her father under the act.

Roshni Tiwari appealed before the Allahabad High court against the rejection order of the application filed by her under section 20(3) of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,1956 sought maintenance from her father.

In the said application, she had claimed maintenance on two grounds; firstly that she had been doing nursing course and her mother had incurred huge expenditures ineducating her. She was paying Rs. 3500/- per month towards fee and there was no other source of income.  Another ground, Roshni sought that she needs money for her marriage as an expense since her father is no taking her responsibility of marriage. 

Counsel for Roshni Tiwari submits before Allahabad High court that the finances were initially arranged by her mother and now by herself for Nursing course and pursued a Post Basic Nursing Training Course from college at Bhopal. Her father had not even paid basic education expense. A sum of Rs.1000/- per month was being given towards maintenance states Roshni Tiwari before Allahabad High Court. 

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Counsel for Balmukund contends before the High Court of Allahabad that Roshni Tiwari is self sufficient as she has started earning after completion of Staff Nursing Course.  

The position and status of Balmukund Tiwari is that he is in government department and working as Tube well operator in Irrigation Department, contends Balmukund Tiwari before Allahabad High Court.

The Supreme Court on Wednesday issued a notice in a plea filed by an investigating officer who has challenged the order of High Court wherein the court had directed his prosecution for giving false evidence which in turn had led to the acquittal of the accused, Ravi alias Toli, for rape and murder of 7-year-old girl.

The matter was listed before the bench of Justice S. Abdul Nazeer and Justice Aniruddha Bose. Senior Advocate H.S. Phoolka, who appeared for petitioner Sanjeev Chouksey, argued that there are unanswered questions in this matter and nine important aspects, the high court had ignored while passing the judgment. “As a officer of the court, it hurts me to see that deceased minor girl mother has also been prosecuted,” he added. 

The high court was of the view that investigating officer Sanjeev Chouksey and other prosecution witnesses gave false evidence against Ravi@Toli before the trial court. “Only the Supreme Court and the High Court has the power to award sentence of life imprisonment for the remainder of life and not the trial court possess such power to award such sentence.” Such was an observation of Madhya Pradesh High court while reversing the conviction of Ravi into an acquittal. 

The Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court mentions the operation of applicability of a provision of section 376(3)IPC either in prospective or retrospective. It submits that nothing is on record available which suggests that section 376(3) IPC applies in retrospectively. 

The seizure of slacks, blood-stained earth was nothing but a sham only with a purpose to create false evidence. The High Court pointed out seeing the conduct of Sanjeev Chouksey. It appeared that while sprinkling the blood of the accused Ravi on different articles, the blood of the accused Ravi was also sprinkled on the shawl, and thereafter, when the investigating officer, Sanjeev Chouksey (P.W. 31) realized that presence of blood on Shawl would bring the prosecution story under doubt, then it was not sent to any laboratory. 

‘High Court’s critical observations on IO’s part’

Substantial Question of law raised by petitioner in the Special Leave Petition that –a) Whether the conduct of the Petitioner amounts to an offence that falls under section 194 or 195A IPC? b) Whether the High court followed the due procedure as mentioned under section 340 CRPC without conducting preliminary inquiry before directing for prosecution for giving false evidence before the court. 

Grounds raised by the petitioner in the petition that there is nothing on record to depict that there was any collusion between Petitioner and accused Ravi regarding involvement any fabricated evidence.

Secondly, the High court erred to appreciate the fact that it is well-settled law that prosecution for perjury should be ordered only when it is considered expedient in the interest of justice to punish delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in a statement which could be irrelevant.

The prosecution case is that on October 24, 2015, accused Ravi kidnapped a 7-year-old minor qua prosecutrix from a temple outside platform of Railway Station Bhopal from the custody of her lawful guardians. She was taken to Vidisha and was brutally raped and killed by smothering. Her dead body was found in a well in the field of Mullu Patel in Vidisha. A blue jeans found in the well was seized. Tibia bone for diatom test, sternum bone, 5 ml of blood of the deceased, viscera, uterus, heart, kidney, spleen and liver, whole stomach and its contents, a piece of small intestine, and salt solution were sealed and handed over to the police constable.

At the instance of accused Ravi, a T-shirt was recovered. Since the dead body of the deceased was already buried, the mother of the deceased refused to exhume the body and identified it from a photo. DNA test report was obtained. 

The accused Ravi contented in the HC: The prosecution has failed to prove the DNA, as well as medical and scientific evidence against the appellant/accused; 

(ii) The circumstance of last seen together is not proved; 

(iii) chain of circumstances is not complete;

(iv) Faulty and illegal investigation has given a deep dent to the prosecution case

(v) The prosecution has failed to prove the place of occurrence

(vi) Presence of Deceased in Bhopal has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt 

(vii) Presence of accused at the alleged place of incidence i.e., place of kidnapping i.e. Bhopal and the well from where the dead body was recovered i.e. Vidisha has not been proved.

(viii) The arrest of the appellant/accused and seizure of articles is contrary to law

(ix) FIR is ante dated and ante timed

(x) Erroneous and illegal findings recorded by the Trial Court 

(xi) Non-compliance of Section 53-A of Cr.P.C. ; 

(xii) Aggravating and Mitigating circumstances have not been taken into consideration 

(xiii) In the alternative, the death sentence be commuted to Life Imprisonment.

A reference was sent by the trial court to the High Court under Section 366 CrPC with regard to confirmation of death sentence. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh was directed to remand back the matter with an direction to the trial court to commence with examination in chief, cross-examination and re examination of Investigating Officer namely Sanjeev Kumar Chouksey  and that too in presence of accused Ravi alias Toli. In addition to it, a  fresh statement to be recorded under section 313 CrPC and to pronounce judgment afresh.  

The charge sheet against accused Ravi  for offence under Sections 302, 376(2)(i),(j),(k),(l), 376 (a), (b), 201, 363, 364, 75 of I.P.C. and under Section 5(m)/6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 was preferred.  

Ravi alias Toli was arrested on 6-11-2015 and for the last near about 6 years, he is in jail. Initially, he was awarded a death sentence by judgment and sentence dated 26-9-2019. The Division Bench of High court directed Registrar General  to circulate copies of its judgment to all sessions and additional sessions Judges to intimate the trial courts that they cannot award life imprisonment for the remainder of the life of accused.

The Supreme Court on Thursday allowed the Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) candidates to participate in the counselling of the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (Undergraduate), 2021 in the general category.

While allowing the plea, the bench headed by Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, told ASG Aishwarya Bhati, appearing for the Centre, that there is problem in notification with regard to its timing (the date when it’s passed). The Court was hearing the plea, challenging the March 4 notification issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, directing OCI candidates to be treated on par with Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) for the purpose of NEET. This would mean successful OCI candidates would have to pay higher fee paid by NRIs for medical seats in India.

The Court noted in its order, “We are of the view that at least for the current academic year 2021-2022, the petitioners are entitled to be considered eligible for all medical seats which the OCIs were eligible for before the issuance of the impugned notification dated March 4.

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“We direct the National Testing Agency to declare the result of NEET-UG 2021 examination taken by the petitioners and the eligible petitioners are permitted to appear for the counselling in general category. The immediate problem is the clause in your notification, now see, one thing is certain, Articles 14 and 15 are applicable to citizens, not 16. The problem of the notification is the timing.

“Article 21 is available so far as the notification is concerned. Our country is known for inclusiveness, you can bring non-citizens and give them citizenship. These are very much Indians. Maybe they have gone abroad. Section 9 must have been upheld many times now. But, we are on a question of an immediate problem, namely the notification,” it added. 

ASG Bhati replied, “I appreciate, I acknowledge. The notification does not take away any right. They still have right to participate in examination. My lord earlier notification allowed only depending on each state to state. First is Indian citizens, the second category is NRI, they are non-resident citizens. Third category is these OCI card holders, they have voluntary taken up the citizenship. They have to meet a much lesser threshold. My lord they only need to be in India for 12 months, for other they have to make for much longer period. The crux of the matter is they have to pay higher fees. Lakhs and lakhs of young citizens of our country are not getting these seats and resources.

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“You say no right has been taken away in notification, but in fact, it takes away the right. The only thing is you can publish the notification, arbitrariness is still in question. Only the matter of timing is arbitrary,” the bench retorted.

The Court passed the interim order on a plea challenging the March 4 notification issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, which treats Overseas Citizens of India at parity with Non Resident Indians (NRIs) with regard to All India Entrance Tests, such as NEET, JEE (Mains), JEE (Advanced) or such other tests for the purpose of admissions.

It had also sought direction to declare clause 4 (ii) of the notification as ultra vires Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution, as it fails to treat resident Indian OCIs with resident Indian citizens in all matters of entry and admission to professional colleges in India from the year 2021-2022 onwards.

The Supreme Court on Wednesday issued notice to the Uttar Pradesh government on a bail plea filed by Khushi Dubey, minor wife of Amar Dubey, an accused in the Bikru encounter, wherein gangster Vikas Dubey and his accomplices had killed eight police officials on the night of July 2, 2020.

A bench of Justice S. Abdul Nazeer and Justice Krishna Murari stated that it will only give any opinion after the reply from the state of Uttar Pradesh. Further, the bench also sought the response of state apropos the minor age of accused Khushi Dubey at the time of arrest. Khushi had challenged the order of Allahabad High Court, which rejected her bail application.

Khushi’s Counsel argued that she was 17 years and 10 months old, when she was arrested and that she got married just a few days before the incident. He further stated that another FIR was filed against Khushi when she was in custody and the bail applicant has nothing to do with the incident. Further, she has been in jail custody for a year now.

On the night of July 2, 2020, a police team had gone to Bikru village in Kanpur Nagar, to arrest Vikas Dubey from his house. Police faced an ambush set by the dreaded gangster, who along with his henchmen, opened indiscriminate firing on the police force. This led to death of eight police personnel and grievous gunshot injuries to another six, besides a Station House Officer of the local police station. 

The police personnel who survived the shootout said in their statements under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure that while the men pumped bullets into the police personnel, wives of all the accused were aiding and instigating their husbands. Khushi was also credited with the role of instigating the men. She is stated to have been atop a house adjoining Vikas Dubey’s, during the entire course of the brutal assault.

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Khushi had earlier applied for bail before the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB), wherein she was found to be 16 years, 10 months and 12 days old on the date of occurrence. The JJB, however, rejected the bail application of the accused two times. She then filed an appeal before the Sessions court under Section 101 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which was also rejected. Khushi then moved the High Court, wherein the court while rejecting the appeal, observed that the case wherein the accused is involved is not of ordinary kind.

The Court noted that not only the spontaneous elimination of eight policemen in action and six others left injured, is a horrendous crime that shocks the conscience of the society, but also an act that strikes at the roots of the State’s authority in its territory. It speaks about the unfathomable extent of the lack of fear of the State in the minds of those who conceived and executed the dastardly act. Even if not primarily but certainly as an important player, the accused seems to have actively participated. However, the court also opined that the remarks are confined to judging the accused’s bail plea and should, in no way, be understood or construed as comments on the merits of the case.

The Supreme Court on Monday refused to grant any further relief to a man, who was convicted for murdering a person posted as corporal at Air Force Station Bhisiana and shredded his body into pieces more than four years back, and whose death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.

A bench comprising Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari, while dismissing the appeal of Sailesh Kumar seeking remission of sentence, said “You have come in a bad case, you were given relief earlier.”

Advocate Sunil Kumar Jain, appearing for the petitioner, urged the court to remit the sentence of Sailesh.

Sunil Kumar Jain, advocate for Sailesh, submitted that there was no evidence, only on basis of Section 106 IPC, Sailesh was convicted, as except recovery, no last seen theory was established by any evidence.  He further submitted that there has to be other circumstantial evidence, which has to be proved by the prosecution.

Sailesh had moved the Supreme court against the Punjab and Haryana High Court order, wherein his death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment and he had to compulsorily serve minimum sentence of 20 years without being entitled to any remission/commutation. The trial court sent had reference in terms of Section 366 CrPC to the High court for confirmation of death sentence. The appeals were also filed by Sailesh and his wife Anuradha Patel, co-convict in the murder case.

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The apex court asked, “From where the parts of body recovered?”

Sunil replied, “From my flat.”

The matter pertains to murder of one Vipin Kumar Shukla, husband of complainant Kumkum Shukla. Vipin went missing on February 8, 2017, whose body was found shredded into pieces on February 21, 2017. The FIR was lodged by complainant Kumkum on February 15, 2017.

The fact of case is that Kumkum and her father-in-law Triveni Shukla came to know that Sailesh and Shashi Bhushan Patel had abducted Vipin and murdered him and that they had concealed his body after cutting the same into pieces and that Anuradha had instigated them and had also helped them in concealing the body. On getting information, they both went to the quarter of the accused, where they noticed a foul smell emanating and they saw Anuradha trying to shut doors and windows of their house on account of which they became sure that the three persons had murdered Vipin and had concealed the body in their house.

The information was conveyed to the police, which came to the spot and interrogated Sailesh. The accused told police about 16 black polythene bags containing the pieces of Vipin’s body, which were recovered from his house later. Inquest proceedings were conducted and post-mortem examination was conducted on the body.

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The Prosecution alleged that the body of the deceased, which had been chopped into pieces, was recovered at the instance of Sailesh from his house. this hardly leaves anything to be imagined, particularly when apart from recovery of the body, the weapon of offence and the mobile phones of the deceased were also recovered from the house of the accused.

Burden of proving fact is on the person having knowledge of it

The Counsel for Sailesh assailed the impugned judgment of trial court before High Court of Punjab that inter-alia, on the ground that it is a case based totally on circumstantial evidence, which is mainly in the shape of disclosure statement of the accused Sailesh himself, which can hardly be said to be a substantial or convincing piece of evidence and is rather a weak type of evidence, which would not justify conviction of the appellants in the absence of any other corroborative evidence pointing towards the guilt of the accused.

ILNS: The Supreme Court has issued a notice in a plea, which challenged the action of the Ministry of Road Transport And Highways in not allowing the petitioner-school to ply diesel vehicles of more than 10 years old in the National Capital Region for picking up and setting down the children in Baghpat District.

The Bench of Justice S Abdul Nazeer and Justice Sanjiv Khanna issued notice in the plea filed by a school through Advocate Rani Chabbra.

Advocate Chabbra’s reliance was placed on the order of the apex court in Sarvodaya Public School & Ors Vs The Transport Commissioner & Ors, whereby the top court allowed the Sarvodaya Public School to ply diesel buses for the unexpired period of three year on condition that they will not enter into NCT of Delhi.

The plea stated, “In the District of Baghpat, only fuel available for these Buses is Diesel and all the Buses being run by the Schools are Diesel vehicles and there is no alternative fuel like CNG available except Diesel and all the vehicles are to depend on only fuel Diesel.”

Earlier in 2015, the Principal Bench of the National Green Tribunal, New Delhi, passed orders banning of Diesel vehicles more than 10 years old to operate on National Capital Region of Delhi.

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Thereafter, in 2017, NGT ordered, “The applicants who have prayed for running of buses in the district of Moradabad, Bulandshahar, Meerut, and Muzzafarnagar, which are more than 10 years old, would be permitted to ply for a period of three years from today, within which time they should replace the said vehicles, either by buses which are BS-IV compliant or shifting to CNG.”

ILNS: The Supreme Court on Monday issued notice in a plea, which was filed to assail the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019, as being violative of the various provisions of the Constitution of India, for being violative of basic principle, foundation and structure of the Constitution and preamble of the Constitution.

The bench of Justice S. Abdul Nazeer and Justice Sanjiv Khanna ordered this matter to be tagged along a writ petition, which was filed in 2019 as the Indian Union of Muslim League vs Union Of India.

Petitioner Uttam Kumar Samanta is a resident of West Bengal and president of a social organisation, Bangla o Bangalee. Advocate Chand Qureshi, counsel for the petitioner, alleged in his petition that the CAA 2019, wherein religion is introduced as a condition for the acquiring Indian citizenship for illegal, undocumented, illegitimate, unwanted migrants of Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi and Christian faiths coming from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Such classification on the basis of religious identity to undocumented migrants clearly violates Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 355 of the Constitution, he noted.

“The basic, principles and foundation of democracy and the Constitution have been violated by the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019. Democracy is meant by the people, of the people and for the people and so the same is the basics, principle and foundation of the Constitution,” said Qureshi.

“The government and representative elected by the people of the state/nation or a domain in a democracy can pass order and enact bill/act/law for the interest of people and not for the exclusive interest of the illegal, undocumented, unauthorised, illegitimate and unwanted outsiders that is exclusively against the interest and benefit of the citizens of the state/nation,” he added.

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The plea said, “The government and representative elected by the people of the state/union or a domain in a democracy if undermine the interest and benefit of the native people of the state/nation, but committed to the interest of the illegal, illegitimate and unwanted, undocumented people from outside and refugees and give them priority, privilege, benefit and right exclusively against the interest of the citizen of the State/nation by any act/law/order than that is violation of basic democratic and constitutional foundation, principles and provisions of the country, preamble of the Constitution, basic features, overall Constitution adopted by the people of the nation and their founders.”