The conduct of a trial judge as he “assisted” a rape accused was questioned by the Delhi High Court as this is a heinous crime for which there can be no monetary settlement 

By Dr Swati Jindal Garg

Proving that justice should not only be done, but also seen to be done, the Delhi High Court recently expressed concern over the conduct of a trial court judge for allegedly “suggesting” and “assisting” a man accused of rape to settle the matter during the recording of prosecution evidence.

The High Court’s observations came during the hearing of a plea by the accused seeking quashing of the FIR registered against him for alleged rape in 2020, on the ground that the matter had been settled and compromised. The Court thereafter directed that the case be tried by another judge to ensure that justice is done.

Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma, who was hearing the matter, said: “This Court is disturbed by the fact that it was the learned Trial Court Judge, as stated at bar as well as in the petition which is accompanied by an affidavit regarding the truthfulness of averments made in the petition, who had enquired from the victim if she wished to enter into a compromise with the accused. The Settlement Agreement in question also mentions the same, and in fact, the Agreement also records that the parties have arrived at an agreement with the aid and assistance of the learned Trial Court.”

She also observed that once the trial court had framed charges against the accused and the prosecution evidence was recorded, there was no comprehensible reason why the trial court judge would have asked the woman to settle the matter involving a heinous offence like rape. The High Court further recorded that the woman had also stated before it that she had entered into a settlement agreement only at the asking of the trial court judge and this was mentioned in the agreement itself “which is duly notarized”. Justice Sharma added: “Therefore, this Court expresses concern over the conduct of the learned Trial Court Judge, if it is true, that the Trial Judge had suggested and assisted the accused and the victim, in a case under Section 376 of IPC, to settle the matter, while the same Court was recording the prosecution evidence.”

The petition filed before the Court clearly disclosed that the man had agreed to pay Rs 3.5 lakh to the woman if the FIR was quashed, wherein she had agreed that “whatever happened between her and the accused had happened out of her free will and it was a consensual relationship”. The agreement filed along with the petition also stated that the woman had agreed that she had deposed against the accused before the trial court due to a “misunderstanding”.

Taking note of the fact that the settlement seemed to be based solely on the exchange of money, the judge said: “Money, it seems, is to be exchanged for getting a quietus to the present criminal proceedings for offence of rape—a proposition that is not only immoral but also strikes at the very core of our criminal justice system.”

It cannot be denied that rape is not only a heinous violation of a woman’s bodily autonomy, but also an offence against society at large. Taking consideration of these facts, the High Court remarked that allowing a settlement like in the present case would amount to “trivializing the sufferings of a rape victim, and reducing her anguish to a mere transaction”.

The High Court further said that if the woman’s prior statements before the police, the magistrate and the trial court are based on a misunderstanding arising from a consensual relationship as has been stated in the settlement agreement, then the “need for monetary compensation to settle the matter becomes questionable”.

The High Court also took note of the fact that the woman had made specific allegations in her testimony against the accused such as he had intoxicated her and then established physical relations with her without her consent. He had also taken inappropriate photographs and videos of her and threatened her. In the light of these submissions made by her, it was quite strange that the matter is claimed to have been settled on the grounds that it was a “misunderstanding”. 

Constitutional courts have, in the past too, expressed concern over criminal cases being settled with money. The apex court had in a case filed before it held that an FIR lodged for abetment of suicide cannot be quashed on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else, as it would set a dangerous precedent where complaints would be lodged to extract money.

This statement was given by a bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and V Ramasubramanian who said that heinous or serious crimes, which are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society, cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise between the offender and the complainant or the victim.

The bench said: “Crimes like murder, rape, burglary, dacoity and even abetment to commit suicide are neither private nor civil in nature. Such crimes are against the society. In no circumstances can prosecution be quashed on compromise, when the offence is serious and grave and falls within the ambit of crime against society.” In this case, the apex court had allowed an appeal filed by a woman called Daxaben against the Gujarat High Court’s order allowing quashing of an FIR related to the suicide of her husband, Shailesh Kumar Chimanbhai Patel. The FIR was lodged by a man, claiming to be a cousin of the deceased, who took the extreme step after being cheated of over Rs 2.35 crore by the accused. 

The Supreme Court clarified that an informant had no right in law to withdraw the complaint of a non-compoundable offence of a grave, serious or heinous nature, which impacts society. “In criminal jurisprudence, the position of the complainant is only that of the informant. Once an FIR and/or criminal complaint is lodged and a criminal case is started by the State, it becomes a matter between the State and the accused. The State has a duty to ensure that law and order is maintained in society. It is for the State to prosecute offenders,” the bench said. 

“In case of grave and serious non-compoundable offences which impact society, the informant and/or complainant only has the right of hearing, to the extent of ensuring that justice is done by conviction and punishment of the offender,” the bench added. The Court further said the criminal proceeding cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction (of the High Court) under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code only because there is a settlement. In this case, the monetary settlement was between the accused and the complainant and other relatives of the deceased to the exclusion of the widow of the deceased.

It needs to be clarified that in compoundable offences, parties to the dispute may enter into a compromise or settlement where the accused provides an amount in the form of consideration to the aggrieved person. However, the same rule does not apply in the case of non-compoundable offences. Compoundable offences as given in Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code are less serious and settled only in good faith. Non-compoundable offences, however, have to go through the whole trial to be quashed. They are of a more serious and grievous nature, which affect society as a whole and not just an individual. The reason to not allow such offences to be compounded is that it would set a bad example in society. Non-compoundable offences are against the public policy and thus settlement is not allowed by a regular court in such offences. Such offences usually include voluntarily causing grievous hurt, hurt by dangerous weapon, dishonest misappropriation, kidnapping or abducting to murder, etc.

The Supreme Court in various judgments has held that in cases when the offence is civil, where the wrong is personal and the matter is resolved between the parties, proceedings can be quashed by the High Court. However, the High Court shall exercise the power under Section 482 to quash any criminal offences which are not in the list of compoundable offences cautiously and with due care and scrutiny. Judges have a meticulous job to check all the necessary parameters and strike a balance between which matters are of interest to be compounded or not. 

The apex court has, in fact, set guidelines based on which the High Courts can exercise the power under Section 482, of Criminal Procedure Code. The guidelines are as follows:

• Nature of offences

The High Court is allowed to use its powers under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash criminal proceedings of non-compoundable nature if the offences involved are predominantly of a civil and commercial nature.

• Serious Offences 

The High Court cannot quash offences of a serious and heinous nature which have an impact on society under Section 482, CrPC.

• Section 307 of IPC

High Courts can quash offences under Section 307 that are categorised as heinous and serious offences and are against society, but only when there is enough evidence to prove it on various parameters. The collected evidence shall be accompanied by the charge sheet filed or the charges framed and/or during the trial, i.e., not permissible when the matter is under investigation. 

• Special Statues

Criminal offences registered under various statutes or when the offences are committed by a public servant while in service shall not be quashed by the High Court based on compromise.

• Antecedent/Conduct

Courts need to consider the antecedent or conduct of the accused while considering the compromise between the parties under Section 482 of the CrPC in case of non-compoundable criminal offences when the offence before the High Court is of a private nature. 

The stance taken by the Delhi High Court in the present case proves that High Courts are proving to be beacons of light for hapless litigants who are prone to various pressures. The law is indeed taking its due course. 

—The writer is an Advocate-on-Record practicing in the Supreme Court, Delhi High Court and all district courts and tribunals in Delhi

By Dr Swati Jindal Garg

The single-judge bench of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma of the Delhi High Court while hearing the Disha Ravi case said that while an individual’s freedom to travel abroad is a cherished right, “it is not absolute”, and criminal courts are duty-bound to “prevent misuse of liberty of bail by individuals”. Activist Ravi was arrested in connection with a February 2021 FIR and later granted bail by a trial court on certain conditions. The FIR had been registered under various IPC sections, including criminal conspiracy and sedition, containing allegations that there was a concerted campaign by “banned terror organisations to disrupt the Republic Day… ceremony through several unlawful acts in the name of protests” and that a “Google document (toolkit)” had come to notice of probe agencies on Twitter which contained a “detailed plan of a larger conspiracy to wage economic, social, cultural and regional war against the country”. It has been alleged by the prosecution that Ravi was the editor of this “toolkit” and taking note of this fact, the Court also said that there is “no infringement of mobility rights of the accused or any geographical boundaries restriction” placed on Ravi, but a reasonable condition of seeking permission of the Court before travelling abroad, which has not been denied to her in the past.

The High Court, however, directed that the state will have to file a response “expeditiously”, giving sufficient time to the trial court to pass an order in case Ravi moves an application seeking permission to go abroad. The Court also clarified that the trial court while imposing certain conditions on the bail granted to Ravi had taken note of the “entire circumstances of the case, and in its wisdom, has imposed (the) condition that in case the petitioner would wish to visit another country, prior permission of the Court will be taken” and that “merely because the condition imposed by the Court as per law is causing inconvenience to the petitioner, it can neither become a ground for deletion of the condition nor it can be said that the same amounts to violation of her fundamental right to travel abroad.”

The Court also took note of the fact that the investigating agency had still not filed a charge sheet and was still collecting evidence from “foreign intermediaries which are crucial pieces of evidence in the present case” due to which it may require Ravi’s presence or information from her, and her going abroad by “merely intimating” and without permission or submitting the itinerary and the duration or purpose of the visit will have “adverse impact” on the investigation and trial of the case.

This is not the first time that the courts have imposed conditions while granting bail to an accused. Our Constitution requires that the accused be presumed innocent before trial, thus granting all citizens the right to a bail hearing, where the accused has the opportunity to be represented by counsel, present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. But, it has been seen that many times justice comes at a price. When bail amount is set unreasonably high, people are behind bars only because they are poor—not because they’re a danger or a flight risk. They don’t have the money to get out of jail and they certainly don’t have money to flee anywhere. Equally worrisome are the conditions imposed at the time of granting bail. While some may be termed as reasonable, there are always those that are impossible to meet, thus creating a scenario wherein the accused remains incarcerated despite having been granted bail only because he has been unable to fulfil the conditions imposed upon him.

In another recent case, Ashish Mishra, son of Union minister Ajay Mishra and a prime accused in the Lakhimpur Kheri violence case, had been granted bail by the trial court on the condition that he would not stay either in Uttar Pradesh or in Delhi during the period. Mishra, however, approached the Supreme Court in a modification application, stating that his mother is admitted to the Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital in Delhi and also his daughter needs treatment for certain deformities in her legs due to which he may be allowed to stay in Delhi. The apex court allowed his application on humanitarian grounds with the rider that Mishra should not participate in any public function or address the media with regard to the ongoing case in Delhi. The top court also clarified that the prohibition imposed upon Mishra with regard to entering Uttar Pradesh would continue to operate.

Every citizen of India has a fundamental right to freedom guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, which specifically states: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” Any individual who violates the law of the land is bound to face consequences as per the law, and in such a case, his freedom may be restricted depending upon the gravity of offence committed. Such individuals, however, also have the right to move the court for bail which may then depend upon the merits of each case to allow or reject the bail application.

Section 437 of the IPC empowers the Court to impose any condition at the time of granting bail, subject to the rider that such a condition should be reasonable, pragmatic and not unfair. In the words of the apex court: “The words ‘any condition’ used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a Court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance and effective in the pragmatic sense and should not defeat the order of grant of bail.”

In the case of Sumit Mehta vs NCT of Delhi, the Supreme Court had set aside the decision of the Delhi High Court, wherein the bail applicant was directed to deposit an amount of Rs 1,00,00,000 (one crore) in fixed deposit in the name of the complainant in the nationalized bank and to keep the FDR with the investigating officer. The Supreme Court had, thereafter, in Sheikh Ayub vs. State of M.P., while adjudicating upon the reasonability of the imposed bail conditions held: “By the impugned order, the Appellant was granted bail and directed to deposit Rs.2,50,000/- which is alleged to be the amount appropriated by the Appellant. There was also a condition for furnishing a surety bond for Rs. 50,000/-. In the circumstances of the case, direction to deposit Rs. 2,50,000/- was not warranted, as part of the conditions for granting bail.”

Further, the apex court had in another matter, Ramathal and others vs Inspector of Police and Another, held that the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, had not taken into account the entire facts of the case in proper perspective while adjudicating, since the condition imposed by the High Court asking the applicant to deposit a sum of Rs 32 lakh was unreasonable and onerous, and beyond the means and power of the appellants, and hence the matter was remitted back to the High Court.

Then, there have also been cases wherein the courts have imposed conditions like granting of bail subject to planting of tree saplings wherein, in its reasoning, the court observed that “human existence is at stake because of the environmental degradation”, and so the due compliance of its direction must be ensured in the interest of environmental protection. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, for example, had directed the accused in a 2020 bail order to register themselves as “COVID-19 warriors”, donate to the PM CARES Fund, and work in “COVID-19 Disaster Management”. The reasoning of the court for such a peculiar order was that “human resource in shape of young-aged appellants could be utilized for the betterment of the society and to ward off the crises”.

The Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court had also, in 2020, established a new trend during the pandemic—of requiring undertrials to give money for the production and distribution of food to the needy and the underprivileged sections of society, and last year, the Madhya Pradesh High Court, while granting bail to a college student, had imposed the condition of serving at community health centre twice a week.

Considering that the thumb rule is “bail and not jail”, the primary objective of the provisions providing for bail and the related conditions imposed should not be to detain and arrest an accused person, but to ensure his appearance at the time of trial, thereby making sure that if the accused is held guilty, he will be available to suffer the consequence of the offence committed in terms of the punishment imposed upon him in accordance with the law. It would be highly unjust and unfair to deprive the alleged accused of his liberty which is his fundamental right during the pendency of the criminal proceeding against him, especially in the light of the fact that the accused is primarily innocent until proven guilty. The release on bail upon appropriate considerations and imposition of reasonable conditions is significant not only to the accused and his family members who might be dependent upon him, but also the society at large and hence the court is duty bound to contemplate the facts and circumstances prevailing in the matter and strike a balance between considerations and imposition of the reasonable conditions before it passes any bail order.

—The writer is an Advocate-on-Record practicing in the Supreme Court, Delhi High Court and all district courts and tribunals in Delhi

The Delhi High Court recently while refusing bail to a man in an acid attack case, said: “A heinous crime such as acid attack on a woman, disfiguring her for life, in broad daylight in a thickly populated area due to a love proposition repelled by the victim, can evoke strong emotions in the society in addition to inflicting grave psychological trauma to the victim. It is in such situations and cases that the Court’s role as a guardian of justice needs to come to the fore.”

A single judge bench of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma passed the order following a plea by the accused who sought release on the ground that the minimum punishment for the offence was 10 years and that he had already spent nine years in custody. The victim was working as a senior resident in a government hospital in Delhi. The Court went through her medical report and found that she had suffered almost 41% physical disability of her right eye. “She was however, 30 years old at the time of incident and was unmarried. She has been almost punished for her entire life as she would not be able to see the world that she had seen with her both eyes. The physical disability that the victim has suffered may not be understood by a large majority,” said the Court.

The bench said that throwing acid on a girl or any other person with a view to disfigure their faces, etc., with a malice so atrocious so as to disfigure and disable them for life, as in the present case when she was on verge of getting married, is a very serious offence. It said that it had the challenging task of deciding the bail application of the accused who allegedly committed this heinous crime, but remained conscious of his fundamental right to speedy trial and personal liberty as an accused.

The Court said it remained conscious of the fact that both parties were seeking justice from it and that it had to pass an order which would reflect the intricate process that justice follows and pass an order upholding society’s faith in the legal system, whether as a victim or an accused. The Court said that it could not close its eyes to the unseen psychological pain, and the aftermath faced by the victim and how this incident may have evoked fear and insecurity in many girls in society. “Exercising the discretion is a sensitive duty of a Court and a Court will fail in its duty in case only physical pain is assessed and it ignores the unseen, unheard, inaccessible psychological trauma and pain that an acid attack victim lives through everyday.”

Further, the Bench said that while the accused may bemoan his long incarceration when the trial was concluding, he wanted to come out of the jail to breath fresh air and be the same person again, but the Court could not ignore the fact that the victim had to wear black glasses most of her life. 

Bail orders passed by courts play a crucial role in shaping societal perceptions and behaviour as they reflect the judiciary’s stance on specific matters and can serve as a deterrent to certain offenses. It is essential for courts to bear this responsibility in mind when deliberating on bail applications, the order stated.

The bench further noted that acid attacks, characterised by their sheer brutality and devastating consequences, are among the most grievous crimes in contemporary society. They often result in life-altering injuries, causing not only physical pain, but also emotional scars that may never heal. Moreover, acid attacks send shockwaves through communities, spreading fear and anxiety. In this context, the Court’s role in granting or denying bail is of vital significance. “In conclusion, bail orders passed by the Court have a far reaching effect on the society which can be at times beyond an individual case at hand. Such orders have to carry the responsibilities of the Courts towards societal expectations and serve as a means of preventing and discouraging crimes like acid attacks. The Court, cognizant of its role as a guardian of justice and a protector of society, must employ its authority judiciously to ensure a safer, more just, and compassionate world for all,” the order read.

India has witnessed many horrific acid attacks. Last year, in a horrific incident on December 14, a 17-year-old girl on her way to school with her younger sister was attacked with an acid-like substance by two men on a motorcycle near her home in Dwarka. The accused were arrested by the Delhi police, while the victim suffered 8% burns and disfigurement of the face and neck. The accused confessed that they had watched crime shows on TV to escape from the police. During their interrogation, the police found that the acid used was bought by the accused from an e-commerce company.

In 2013, the Supreme Court while hearing a PIL filed in 2006 by a Delhi-based acid attack victim ordered the centre and state governments to regulate the sale of acid in an attempt to prevent their misuse. Accordingly, the home ministry issued an advisory to all states on how to regulate acid sale and framed the Model Poisons Possession and Sale Rules, 2013 under The Poisons Act, 1919. Also, by way of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, the Parliament introduced Section 326A in the Indian Penal Code with the aim of curbing acid attacks and providing justice to the survivors. The provision reads as under: 

“326A. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid, etc.—Whoever causes permanent or partial damage or deformity to, or burns or maims or disfigures or disables, any part or parts of the body of a person or causes grievous hurt by throwing acid on or by administering acid to that person, or by using any other means with the intention of causing or with the knowledge that he is likely to cause such injury or hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and with fine.”

Considering the gravity of this issue, the government had recognised the need to have a specific provision in law to provide strict punishment in cases of acid attacks. 

—By Shivam Sharma and India Legal Bureau

The High Court of Delhi has rejected the bail petition of a person, who was accused of stealing valuable property from a godown situated at Khajuri Khas during the North-East Delhi riots of 2020, at the behest of former AAP Councillor Tahir Hussain. 

The Single-Judge Bench of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma rejected the bail petition of Shoaib Alam, after taking in view the fact that two eye witnesses gave account of his specific role and that threats were being extended to the witnesses.

It further noted that the witnesses were yet to be examined before the Trial Court. The Single-Judge Bench observed that after assessment of threat to the witnesses and finding it real, the concerned authorities had provided protection to them.

As per the FIR filed by one Karan, around 40-50 associates of former Aam Aadmi Party Councillor Tahir Hussain had looted his godown and burnt various goods due to which he suffered loss of about Rs 25 to 30 lakh.

Alam was booked under Sections 109, 114, 147, 148, 149, 427, 454, 395, 435, 436, 153A, 505, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The prosecution claimed that during investigation, it was found that the place of incident was situated at a distance of about 50 to 60 meters from the building owned by Tahir Hussain, which was allegedly used by the rioters, including Alam, for throwing bricks, stone pelting, pelting of petrol bombs and acid bombs. 

Justice Sharma noted that the prosecution has placed on record statements of two witnesses recorded on April 3 and 20, 2020, specifically stating that Alam was involved in the incident and had instigated the mob on communal lines.

It further observed that the beat officers of the area categorically named and assigned specific role to Alam and acts committed by him.

As per the settled law regarding grant of bail, the court was expected to take into account the allegations levelled against the accused as well as the seriousness of the offence committed, it added.

However, the Bench clarified that its observations were only for the purpose of deciding the bail application and would not have any bearing on the merits of the case during trial.

(Case title: Shoaib Alam vs State of NCT of Delhi)

The Supreme Court on Monday was hearing a case relating to the alleged sexual harassment of a law clerk by former Supreme Court judge Justice Swatanter Kumar when it asked if pursuing the transfer petition would serve any purpose.

While hearing the transfer petition filed by the survivor, the bench of Justice KM Joseph and Justice BV Nagarathna asked if it is necessary to go on with this matter now.

Advocate Vrinda Grover, who appeared for the survivor-law clerk, said that she will have to take instructions in this regard.

The matter has been listed the matter for further consideration on February 24.

The transfer petition which was filed by the survivor had asked for a transfer of the main case from the Delhi High Court to a State where the accused judge had not worked.

The petitioner claimed the transfer of case will ensure the accused will not be able to influence the proceedings.

The Delhi High Court had restrained the media from reporting about the matter except court proceedings in 2014.

Justice Kumar had served as a judge of the Delhi High Court, Punjab and Haryana High Court and also as the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court before being elevated to the Supreme Court. He served at the Supreme Court from 2009 to 2012.

After he resigned from the Apex Court, he served in the the National Green Tribunal till December 2017 as the Chairperson.

The Delhi High Court, while rejecting the anticipatory bail petition of an accused related to the Jahangirpuri riots, has observed that the accused allegedly tried to “disturb the communal harmony” of the area by attempting to create a “rift” between two communities.

The order was passed by a Single-Judge Bench of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma on the anticipatory bail application filed by Sheikh Ishrafil, allegedly one of the main conspirators and perpetrators of the violence that erupted in Jahangirpuri area of the national capital on April 16, 2022.

Justice Sharma observed that Ishrafil had not joined investigation and was purposefully evading arrest. the High Court further took note of the fact that suspicious material was found on the terrace of the accused during the riots and that he has been non-cooperative during investigation.

The Bench said that maintaining peace and harmony in the communities, as well as the country, was not the sole responsibility of the law-enforcing agencies and the Courts, but it was the duty of every citizen of this country to ensure that their acts “do not instigate and promote communal hatred or ill-will”.

The bench further took note of the accused being named by one of the eye witnesses as one of the perpetrators of Jahangirpuri violence. It said the accused has been absconding and did not cooperate in the investigation. Rather, proceedings under Sections 82 and 83 of CrPC have been initiated against him.

While stating that the court cannot allow investigations to be thwarted by such applicants, the bench observed that custodial interrogation of the accused was warranted in the present case.

Justice Sharma said since the accused was not cooperating with the investigation agencies to ascertain whether he partook in the alleged activities, he was not entitled to anticipatory bail or to the claim of infringement of his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

AN FIR was registered against the accused under Sections 147, 148, 149, 186, 353, 332, 307, 323, 427, 436, 109, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

In June, 2022, the High Court had dismissed another plea by Ishrafil, in which he had sought directions to the city police not to harass him and his family members in the name of interrogation.

Justice Sharma rejected his petition, ruling that the plea appeared to be of a ‘phishing’ kind, seeking anticipatory bail in the garb of directions to the police not to harass him and his family.

The Delhi High Court has expressed resentment against the filing of rape, sexual assault and cruelty cases, which are later on compromised, stating that this trend needs to be curbed.

The Single-Judge Bench of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma passed the order, while quashing a First Information Report (FIR) registered by a woman against her father-in-law in relation to the offence of rape and cruelty as punishable under the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Justice Sharma observed that ordinarily though cases under Section 376 IPC should not be quashed and taken as a crime against the society at large, however, in the peculiar circumstances of this matrimonial dispute case, where the complainant has stated that her future depends on quashing of the FIR and that rape was not committed upon her, it will be in the interest of justice that the FIR is quashed in its entirety.

She, however, took strong objection over the misuse of Sections 376 (rape) and 354, along with Section 498-A of IPC (husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty).

Such cases, which later result in either compromise or quashing, should not be filed at the first instance, the High Court observed, while hearing the plea filed by the father-in-law of a woman, who accused him of rape.

An FIR had been registered on the instance of the woman at Police Station Mehrauli for offences punishable under Sections 376/377/498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 34 IPC.

Justice Sharma emphasised that though any case coming to an end was a welcome step as it decreased the pendency of courts, quashing was more so welcome in matrimonial offences as it showed that parties have decided to put an end to the misery they undergo due to a matrimonial case pending between them.

The Court observed that the complainant was a young lady, who was looking for a bright future for herself, which depended on quashing of the present FIR pursuant to a settlement which she stated before this Court, she has entered out of her free will and without coercion, pressure or threat.

Justice Sharma appreciated the stand taken by the woman and said that quashing of the FIR in a matrimonial dispute will ensure better future for all parties.

The Bench directed the petitioner to deposit Rs 12,500 in the Delhi High Court Advocates Welfare Fund within a week.

Gangster Lawrence Bishnoi, who is currently lodged in Tihar Jail under the
Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA), on Wednesday withdrew his petition filed before the Delhi High Court, seeking enhancement of security cover, fearing fake encounter by Punjab Police.

The Counsel for Bishnoi had earlier moved a petition before the Delhi High Court, seeking his safety in the wake of alleged involvement of Bishnoi in the murder of singer and Congress leader Sidhu Moose wala.

The Counsel had sought to ensure safety of Bishnoi before giving his custody to any other state police, including the Punjab Police and further sought a direction to both the Tihar Jail authorities and the Delhi Police, to ensure necessary safeguards.

Bishnoi’s petition is listed before Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma for hearing today.

A Delhi district court had earlier refused the plea made by Lawrence, forcing him to move the High Court.

Lawrence was arrested in connection with a case registered under the stringent provisions of MCOCA.

Renowned Punjabi singer Shubhdeep Singh Sidhu, popularly known as Sidhu Moose Wala, was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in Punjab’s Mansa district on May 29, a day after the state government curtailed his security cover.

The Counsel for Bishnoi had sought that a direction to the Central Tihar jail authorities to give prior intimation to his advocates, before giving his custody to any other state police, including Punjab police.

Bishnoi claimed that he was apprehending a fake encounter by the Punjab Police due to political unrest between different political parties.

The petition further demanded both the Delhi Police and the Tihar Jail authority to ensure that Bishnoi was duly handcuffed, shackled and videographed during the production warrant and on transit remand, if any warrant was produced by the Punjab Police.