Coordination between the US and other members of the Quad group is aimed at sending a firm message to China that its aggressive expansionism in the Indo-Pacific region Ladakh, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific is coming to an end.

By Praful Bakshi

The world is witnessing a new phenomenon the rise of an aggressive China thirsting for land and sea territories in the nations surrounding it and creating a zone of hostility. These hostile activities extend from the South China Sea, Sea of Japan, the sea around Taiwan and a large number of island territories. Besides, China is also manipulating to take over various ports and harbour facilities from Hambantota in Sri Lanka to Gwadar in Pakistan as well as in the Maldives, Myanmar and Bangladesh right up to Djibouti in Sudan. Along with this is the constant struggle with India since 1959 to claim thousands of sq km of territory in Ladakh and northeast India in Arunachal Pradesh. 

The Sino-Indian border dispute between the two countries has been going on right from the days of the clash between the Sikh forces of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the combined forces of the British and China, and later, China-Tibet combined. The conflict in this area is mainly centred around the sovereignty of two strategically important areas, namely Aksai Chin, claimed by China as a part of the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region in Northwest China, and the Tibet Autonomous Region, claimed by India as part of the Union Territory of Ladakh. The second disputed territory is south of the famous McMahon Line, earlier known as NEFA, and now Arunachal Pradesh.

The 1962 Sino-Indian war was fought in both these disputed areas. This was followed by a brief clash in 1967 in Sikkim’s Nathu La sector, followed by a clash in Sumdrong Chong in 1987 and in 2013 over different perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) which eventually deescalated. This was followed in 2017 by the Doklam incident in the Bhutan controlled area on the Sino-Bhutan border. These conflicts did result in brawls of a serious nature which led us to the most recent one at Galwan, where 20 Indian soldiers and, reportedly, over 121 Chinese soldiers lost their lives.

The Chinese have since April 2020 continued intruding into the area controlled by India especially on the west bank of the Galwan river. These have been interspersed by Corps Commander level meetings at Moldo and Chushul, where eight such meetings have taken place. China and India got into a serious clash over the northern shore of Pangong Tso lake, called the finger area, where India is being denied patrolling beyond Finger 4. Besides, China has been busy occupying the tactically important heights specially in Depsang to be in control of action around the most strategically important Daulat Beg Oldie airstrip and the Karakoram Highway.

However, the real turning point came on the night of August 28-29 when the Indian Army’s SFF soldiers of Tibetan origin in a surprise operation, occupied seven crucial heights south of Pangong Tso on the shore of another small lake called Spangur. The total result is that the Indian armed forces have got tactical heights on the Kailash sector as one looks from the south bank of Pangong Tso to Tsaka La.

This means control of the crucial heights like Gurung Hill, Magar Hill, Black Top, Helmet Top, Rezang La Mukhpari and Rechin La. What is of importance is that all these heights are on the Indian side of the LAC and were the scene of intense battles in 1962. China accepts that the alignment of the LAC is correct in these areas except in the case of Black Top, which it says is east of its claim line. China has also ignored all agreements with India and falls back on its 1959 position, which suggests that it is looking for an open confrontation with India.

Conflict in South China Sea

As has been seen down the ages, whenever a group of nations shares a common international zone like a sea, ocean or lakes, and even rivers, a single country, more often than not, keeps its own interest above that of neighbouring countries in the region, be it in common passages for shipping, sharing common bounties of the region, such as fishery or oil or exploration of minerals or a host of other such interests. This situation invariably leads to a constant state of conflict as is evident in the South China Sea.

Countries such as Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam and even Indonesia and Thailand have objected to China claiming practically all of the South China Sea. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has categorically stated: “China’s pursuit of offshore resources in parts of the South China Sea is completely unlawful.” Further, the US has condemned Beijing’s bullying tactics to control international energy rich waters for its own gains and also creating artificial islands for military purposes, directly challenging the overall interests of the US.  

The main problem amongst the countries around the South China Sea in the dispute over territory and sovereignty over the ocean areas are the two chains of islands, namely, Paracel and the Spratly Chains. Along the islands, there are a dozen rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs like the famous Scarborough Shoal which are being claimed by others.

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The islands are not only located to give strategic military advantage against enemy shipping or aerial activity via submarine pens, harbours, runways or missile bases, but are extremely rich in natural resources. It must be appreciated that an island becomes part of the land territory of a country. Hence the sea border of 12 nautical miles and EEZ starts from the island deep in the sea, thus giving a very large strategic advantage to a country controlling the islands.

China’s claim is perhaps the most forceful amongst the South China Sea countries. It claims an area defined by the 9 Dash line, which, on the map, stretches hundreds of miles south and east of China’s southern most province of Hainan. The dispute was taken to the Inter­national Court in Hague, which rejected the claims of China in very clear terms.

China`s claim to Spratly and Paracel islands is challenged by Vietnam, which says that China has only started staking the claim after the late 1940s, while it has papers to prove it belonged to Vietnam from early 17th century onwards.

America is absolutely clear that China would like to control the entire South China Sea, as over 70 percent of its trade passes through the Malacca Strait and over 80 percent of its oil comes from the Gulf through this route. Any hostility by China against shipping would affect its economy very adversely.

Moreover, billions of dollars have been invested by China in various trade routes and OBOR projects like the CPEC in the PoK region close to Western Ladakh. China wants to be in control of the important sea route and lanes, especially in the South China Sea.

The atmosphere of hostility against Chinese bullying tactics by most of these countries is bolstered by the fact that they are fully supported by the US, the UK and France. The moral support of these powers is not limited to papers or media. Both the US and the UK have sent warships and aircraft carriers to the region along with supporting ships and submarines.

The Quad Factor

After the Chinese claim of an island close to Papua New Guinea and its attempt to militarise it, leading countries of the Indo-Pacific region, namely Japan and Australia along with India and led by the US, have decided to give a strategic mandate to the Quad group already formed by them. The recent meeting of the Quad in Tokyo clearly spelt out their intention to put a stop to the expansionist tendencies of China.

America has not only spelt out its stand against China, but also convinced the other three member countries of the Quad to modify their respective foreign policies to counter China, somewhat in a similar manner as NATO stood against the Soviet led Warsaw pact countries.

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Hence, it is quite clear that Quad is an informal strategic forum. It was initially formed with a host of programmes covering humanitarian and disaster relief as well as anti-terrorist activities, but with the Chinese threat looming in the South China Sea, Australia has been brought in as a partner along with joint military operations and joint training and logistic operations. 

This has led to 2+2 meetings between the member countries of the Quad. The coming 2+2 ministerial dialogue this month between India and US would call for heads of defence and external affairs ministries from the two countries to meet. This would be the format with all the other countries. Needless to say, it is now quite clear that the countries realise that foreign affairs must include the military aspect.

A number of joint naval and air exercises have been undertaken by regional countries not only amongst themselves, but also with other powers specially the US and the UK. The aim is to practise inter-operability of fighting equipment and manpower against a common enemy along with joint tactics and cooperation to meet a common military goal. The most recent one was conducted on October 19 between the US, Japan and Australia in the South China Sea. The main idea is to have a free and open Indo-Pacific zone.

The most important of these is the Malabar Naval Exercise. It started in 1992 between the US and India, and included Japan in 2015. Now from 2020 onwards, Australia has been included to become truly a Quad exercise. These exercises practise all aspects of naval and air operations, including landing operations by armies via landing craft. The aim is to send a firm message to China, that its days of expansionism are coming to an end.   

—The writer is a military analyst and air accident investigator

Even as nations are in the midst of fighting Covid-19, Indian and Chinese troops have been locked in an eyeball to eyeball confrontation in eastern Ladakh for nearly three weeks. This seems to be the biggest standoff after the 73-day Doklam standoff on the Sikkim border in August 2017.

Since April 2020, Chinese troop concentrations close to the border had been noticed. However, the confrontation was triggered when they physically tried to prevent Indian troops patrolling the Pangong Tso Lake on May 5. In the fisticuffs that followed, troops used iron rods and sticks, in which 100 were reported injured.

Though local commanders from both sides met and agreed to disengage the next day, the standoff has now spread to Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley, Demchok and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO). Both sides have massed troops, with the potential to explode into an armed conflict.

Indian troops clashed in these places during the 1962 war with China. This underlines their strategic importance to our national security, particularly after China and Pakistan stepped up their strategic cooperation during the last decade.

Estimates of troops on both sides vary, from 2,000-5,000. But the difficult terrain and high altitude makes the deployment of even 500 troops at a time tough, according to some generals with hands-on experience in the region. Another clash took place between Chinese and Indian troops on May 9 at Naku La in north Sikkim; ten soldiers were reported injured. The clash occurred even though there was no major dispute between the two about the international border in Sikkim. This would indicate that the Chinese are reminding India about its vulnerability.

On May 18, China accused India of “trespassing and illegally building defence facilities” in Galwan Valley. Chinese Communist Party tabloid Global Times mentioned that China had enhanced control measures throughout the border in Ladakh. It quoted Hu Zhiyong, a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, as saying that Galwan Valley was not like Doklam because it was in the Aksai Chin region of southern Xinjiang. So, if India escalates friction, its military could pay a heavy price.

So far, parleys between the military commanders in Ladakh have not yielded results. However, diplomatic efforts are on to defuse the situation. After making standard comments to buttress their territorial claims, the Chinese have given tentative signals of a thaw. This was evident from Chinese ambassador Sun Weidong’s conciliatory statement on May 26.

From past experience of such confrontation, followed by conciliation, it is going to be a long haul before the troops stand down in Ladakh and return to normal activity. However, given the complexity of India-China relations at all levels, our country is unlikely to lower its guard any time soon.

After the 1962 conflict, it took nearly three decades for India-China relations to move from confrontation to cordiality. An agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the border areas was signed on September 7, 1993. During President Jiang Zemin’s visit to India in November 1996, India and China signed an agreement on confidence-building measures along the LAC. It provided for border security and confidence measures between the two countries. It called for military disclosure when they undertake border exercises and for the reduction of troop levels in the border areas. It also allowed them to observe and inspect troop movements in each other’s territory upon invitation. This agreement built mutual trust, though border incidents continued. However, both sides handled them away from media glare.

During Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in April 2005, the two sides signed an agreement on political settlement of the boundary issue, setting guidelines and principles to the boundary issue through equal and friendly negotiations. An important milestone in these relations was the signing of the border defence cooperation pact on October 24, 2013 during PM Manmohan Singh’s visit to China. It put no restrictions on India developing border infrastructure or enhancing military capabilities there.

Against this background, 2019 may be considered a very constructive one. It saw interaction between the two countries at various levels starting with the Mamallapuram informal summit in October 2019 where PM Narendra Modi met President Xi Jinping. Evidently, the two leaders were trying to build upon their constructive engagement at the Wuhan informal summit a year earlier. The positive vibes created at Wuhan managed to patch up, if not mend, the frayed relations after the standoff at Doklam at the Sikkim-Tibet-Bhutan tri-junction.

But a month before Xi’s participation in the Mamallapuram Connect, Indian and Chinese troops were involved in a scuffle on the banks of Pangong Tso. Though it was defused after talks between the commanders from the two sides, it was a stronger reminder that no amount of bonhomie can wish away the border disputes acting as a drag on bilateral relations.

However, Xi did not raise or discuss the Kashmir issue, though Pakistan PM Imran Khan had made a number of visits to Beijing seeking China’s support to internationalise it after India abolished the special status of J&K. After the Mamallapuram meeting, Xi said: “We will seek a fair and reasonable solution to the border issue that is acceptable to both sides in accordance with the agreement on political guiding principles.” He also suggested that both countries needed to improve levels of military and security exchanges and cooperation, which was followed up. Even Covid-19 did not halt interaction between the two countries. They went ahead with the “Hand-in-Hand-2019”, the eighth edition of the India-China joint military exercise on counterterrorism and disaster relief. The objective of it was to build and promote positive relations between the two armies. The PLA contingent of 130 troops from the Tibet Military Command participated in the exercise.

In the same month, the 22nd round of talks between the special representatives, National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval and China’s State Councillor Wang Yi, was held in Delhi. They involved the most complex part of the negotiations—agreeing on a framework to resolve the dispute in all sectors. After that, the final step will be delineating and demarcating the boundary in maps and on the ground.

In spite of all the bonhomie, why does China create a military crisis in Ladakh when India is on the back foot fighting Covid-19? The answer lies in the importance of Ladakh for the strategic security of Xinjiang and Tibet, which form China’s longest land border with India. This is not the first time that Indian troops manning the border here have confronted Chinese troops transgressing the LAC because they do not accept its alignment. However, on the ground, Indian and Chinese troops have been maintaining patrolling limits that generally pass for the LAC. This makes the present standoff in Ladakh strategically more important for both China and India than Doklam was.

India had deferred improvement of border road connectivity, particularly in unpopulated regions of Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, till 2011. The Chinese took full advantage of this to occupy more and more territory to buttress their claim. Shyam Saran, then NSA, was reported to have submitted a report to the PMO on Ladakh in which he said the PLA had “incrementally” occupied nearly 640 sq-km area at DBO, Chumar and Pangong Tso Lake. Media reports alleged that he had stated that the entire Depsang Bulge was now inaccessible to India.

Chinese intrusions across the LAC came at critical moments. China’s muscular assertions in the Ladakh region have increased in frequency, particularly after India started 61 infrastructure projects to improve connectivity to the western, central and eastern sectors from 2011 onwards.

In April 2013, when the Manmohan Singh government was getting ready for a general election a year later, Chinese troops intruded into the Depsang Bulge, a table-top plateau, threatening to cut off 750 sq km of northern Ladakh. After a 23-day standoff, they withdrew after Indian diplomatic efforts at the highest level.

This intrusion was strategically significant as it was just 35 km from the Karakoram Pass at the tri-junction of the India-Pakistan-China border and overlooks the Siachen Glacier-Saltoro Ridge to the west and the Indian observation post at Chumar in the east. Equally significant was that the Chinese intrusion took place before China’s Premier Li Keqiang’s scheduled visit on May 20, 2013.

Even as PM Modi extended a red carpet welcome to Xi during his maiden visit to India in September 2014, the atmosphere was marred by confrontation with Chinese troops intruding across the LAC in Ladakh. Apparently irked by such conduct, Modi did not mince words when he drew Xi’s attention to the incident in his statement at the end of the talks. And Xi took note of it.

Former foreign secretary and ambassador to China Nirupama Rao summed up the present situation in her tweet on May 25: “Given absence of line of separation and mutual distancing between sides, no jointly highlighted areas of difference of perception of LAC, we are bound to see more such incidents which now, additionally, have potential to turn into armed confrontation and conflict.”

India will have to take a serious look at China under Xi, which is more aggressive and ambitious. It is in a hurry to become a global power and create a new world order on its own terms. At the same time, Xi is under tremendous international pressure on many fronts after Covid played havoc with global trade and the economy. The US is spearheading a global campaign to hold China responsible for the spread of the virus due to its opaque public health practices.

China’s diplomats have become raucous in their response to them, earning the sobriquet of wolf warriors. China’s “one country-two systems” is under severe strain after Hong Kong’s quest for autonomy started getting out of hand. Taiwan has elected for a second time President Tsai whose party stands for independence and the US has announced it would resume arms sales to Taiwan. Tensions are at a new high in the South China Sea as China is trying to consolidate its control over the sea, brow-beating smaller neighbours like Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam from exploring offshore gas and oil resources.

These vulnerabilities of China could be turned into opportunities for India, with a mix of deft diplomacy, show of strength and imaginative trade and economic policy. That is the only option for India because it works better than empty rhetoric or muscle-flexing when the country is already under tremendous pressure from the pandemic.

—The writer is a military intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Studies Institute

Lead Picture: PIB