The Supreme Court in an ongoing judgment [Satish Chander Ahuja versus Sneha Ahuja] held that a woman can guarantee the privilege of the living arrangement in the houses claimed by family members also. This implies that she can look for living arrangement request concerning property which has a place with parents in law in the event that she and her husband lived there with some permanency after marriage.
What occurs after the divorce of a married couple? Could a woman record a domestic violence grievance after divorce? Would she be able to look for habitation request even after the marriage is disintegrated? These are a portion of the questions which have emerged after the Supreme Court conveyed this judgment.
According to the definition provision in the DV Act, “oppressed individual” signifies any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who asserts to have been exposed to any act of domestic violence by the respondent.
Further, “domestic relationship” is characterized to mean a connection between two people who live or have, anytime of time, lived respectively in a mutual family unit, when they are connected by affiliation, marriage, or through a relationship in the idea of marriage, selection or are relatives living respectively as a joint family;
“Mutual family unit” signifies a family unit where the individual abused day to day routines or at any stage has experienced in a domestic relationship either independently or alongside the respondent and incorporates such a family unit whether possessed or rented either together by the bothered individual and the respondent or claimed or rented by both of them in regard of which either the wronged individual or the respondent or both together or separately have any right, title, intrigue or value and incorporates such a family unit which may have a place with the joint group of which the respondent is a part, regardless of whether the respondent or the oppressed individual has any right, title or enthusiasm for the common family. This definition was deciphered in the Ahuja judgment by overruling prohibitive understanding in SR Batra versus Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169.
Section 19 presents a woman the option to live in a common family. “Notwithstanding anything contained in some other law until further notice in power, each woman in a domestic relationship will reserve the option to dwell in the mutual family unit, regardless of whether she has any right, title or helpful enthusiasm for the equivalent.” Section 12 empowers a distressed individual to introduce an application to the Magistrate looking for at least one reliefs under this Act. Section 19 enables the Magistrate may, on being fulfilled that domestic violence has occurred, pass a habitation request. Home requests can be any of the accompanying kind: (a) controlling the respondent from confiscating or in some other way upsetting the ownership of the bothered individual from the mutual family unit, regardless of whether the respondent has a legitimate or fair enthusiasm for the common family; (b) guiding the respondent to eliminate himself from the mutual family unit; (c) limiting the respondent or any of his family members from entering any segment of the mutual family unit in which the abused individual dwells; (d) limiting the respondent from estranging or discarding the common family or hampering the equivalent; (e) controlling the respondent from denying his privileges in the mutual family unit with the exception of with the leave of the Magistrate; or (f) guiding the respondent to make sure about a similar degree of substitute convenience for the wronged individual as delighted in by her in the mutual family unit or to pay lease for the equivalent, if the conditions so require.
There are disparate perspectives communicated by High Courts on the issue of whether a woman can record a protest under the Domestic Violence Act after divorce. The greater part of them allude to the accompanying two Supreme Court decisions in such manner.
Ensuing Divorce Will Not Deny Benefit To Which Aggrieved Person Is Entitled: SC In Juveria Case
In Juveria Abdul Majid Patni Vs. Atif Iqbal Mansoori [2014(10) SCC 736], the Supreme Court was looking at the accuracy of a request for Sessions Court which excused an application recorded under the Domestic Violence Act as not viable. Inspecting the arrangements of the Act, the court held that an act of domestic violence once dedicated, the ensuing declaration of divorce won’t acquit the risk of the respondent from the offense submitted or to deny the advantage to which the wronged individual is entitled under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 including money related help under Section 20, Child Custody under Section 21, Compensation under Section 22 and interval or ex parte request under Section 23 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
In the above judgment, the Court had likewise seen its prior choice in Inderjit Singh Grewal versus the State of Punjab and another, (2011) 12 SCC 588. All things considered, the Supreme Court had held that ‘Application to Magistrate” under the Domestic Violence Act testing a ‘hoax’ divorce was not viable. The court had suppressed the grumbling recorded by the spouse.
In Juveria, the court said that the law set down in Inderjith isn’t appropriate with the end goal of assurance of the issues engaged with it.
Read Also: CBI: A white elephant?
Rajasthan High Court
In Sabana @ Chand Bai and Anr versus Mohd. Talib Ali , the Rajasthan High Court thought about this issue. The Division Bench held that it “isn’t essential that the candidate woman ought to have a marriage or relationship in the idea of marriage existing and staying alive with the respondent as on the date of coming into power of the Act or at the hour of documenting of the application under Section 12 of the Act before the Magistrate for at least one reliefs as accommodated under the Act. At the end of the day, the abused individual, who had been in a domestic relationship with the respondent anytime of time even preceding coming into power of the Act and was exposed to domestic violence, is qualified for conjure the therapeutic measures accommodated under the Act.” The Special Leave Petition recorded against this judgment was excused in limine by the Supreme Court in 2018.
Telangana High Court
A division seat of Telangana High Court, in Mohd. Kaleem versus Waseem Begum, held that it isn’t essential that the woman ought to have a marriage staying alive and existing with the respondent at the hour of recording of an application under Section 12 of the Act. The simple award of divorce would not exculpate the solicitors from the criminal offenses supposedly perpetrated by them during the presence of a domestic connection between the gatherings. The seat held that the domestic connection between the bothered individual and respondent didn’t stop upon her acquiring a divorce and the DVC is viable comparable to the past acts of domestic violence purportedly dedicated by the respondent.
Punjab and Haryana High Court
The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Neha Chawla versus Virender Chawla , held that there is no such standard that divorce between a couple would totally suspend a spouse from summoning arrangements of Domestic Violence Act and that in certain extraordinary conditions, a wife, notwithstanding her divorce, may in any case have the option to present out a defense for award of alleviation. Notwithstanding, on facts, the court saw that the grievance recorded by the woman against her brothers by marriage under arrangements of Domestic Violence Act, documented following a time of disintegration of her marriage with her husband and additionally after the passing of her husband, particularly when no FIR for any offense u/s 406 or 498-A had ever been stopped at the occurrence of the spouse, must be held as a maltreatment of cycle of law.
In a prior judgment, Amit Agarwal And Ors versus Sanjay Aggarwal . the High Court had held that domestic connection between the abused individual and the respondent must be available and alive when the objection under the Domestic Violence Act is documented. Observing the meaning of the ‘wronged individual and ‘domestic relationship’, Justice Anita Chaudhary mentioned these objective facts: “The utilization of the word is any woman ‘who is’ or ‘has been’. Both the articulations are in the current state. The lawmaking body has not utilized the word ‘who was’ or ‘had been’. This implies the domestic relationship must be in the present and not before. The definition requires that on the date Act come into power, the woman ought to be in a domestic relationship. “The definition obviously talks about a domestic connection between two people who live or have anytime of time lived respectively in a mutual family unit and are connected by marriage or through a relationship in the idea of marriage. This definition additionally talks about the presence of a relationship by marriage or a relationship in the idea of marriage at that point. The articulation utilized is ‘are connected’ by marriage. The articulation by the assembly isn’t ‘were connected’. From the exposed perusing of these two arrangements, it is evident that the goal of the assembly is to ensure those ladies who are living in a domestic relationship. ” It is to be noticed that, for this situation, the grumbling under the DV Act was favored after the announcement of divorce had been allowed.
Calcutta High Court
In Prabir Kumar Ghosh and Ors versus Jharna Ghosh , the Calcutta High Court has held that a divorced spouse can’t guarantee the privilege to living arrangement under section 17 and subsequently a home request under section 19. In any case, the Court saw that a divorce order doesn’t disentitle ladies from being an “oppressed individual” under the Act of 2005. As indicated by the court, Section 17 right to the habitation couldn’t be asserted since it is confined to a woman in a domestic relationship and not to one who had been in such a relationship, e.g., a divorced spouse. Progression of joint habitation in a mutual family or domestic relationship bury se isn’t a sine qua non for the execution of domestic violence to a wronged individual in the structure ‘monetary maltreatment’ under the Act, the Court had watched.
Kerala High Court
Equity K. Harilal of Kerala High Court, in Sulaiman Kunju Vs. Nabeesa Beevi (2015) 3 KLT 65, has held that a divorced spouse isn’t qualified for get any of the reliefs under Section 19 [Residence Orders]. The appointed authority saw that the second appendage of the meaning of ‘domestic relationship’ explicitly connotes that the primary appendage attracts when they are connected by affiliation, marriage or through a relationship in the idea of marriage, selection or are relatives living respectively as a joint family. It was held that a divorced spouse doesn’t fulfill the second appendage of the meaning of the domestic relationship.
In 2016, Justice Sunil Thomas, in Bipin versus Meera, held that even a divorced spouse is qualified for start procedures under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of D.V Act to look for proper reliefs. “Any act of violence which fulfills the meaning of Section 3 of the Act and has a sane nexus to the past wedding relationship, or which emerges consequently or as a spin-off of that relationship ought to reasonably fall inside the arrangements of Domestic Violence Act… ” , the court had held.
Bombay High Court
In 2019, the Bombay High Court in Sadhana versus Hemant, held that domestic violence grumbling isn’t viable if there was no domestic connection on the date of recording of the protest under the DV Act. For another situation [ Atmaram versus Sangita], the court held that spouse is qualified for reliefs under the Domestic Violence Act on the off chance that she kept on cohabitting with her husband(ex) post-divorce.
Gujarat High Court
In Kanji Parmar versus Urmila , the Gujarat High Court held that a divorced spouse who has remarried can’t summon arrangements of Domestic Violence Act against her past husband. The Court, observing Juveria, believed that, after divorce happens among husband and spouse, the arrangements under “the Act” can’t be conjured.
Numerous HCs Followed SC’s Juveria Judgment To Hold That A Complaint After Divorce Is Maintainable
The Andhra High Court in Challa Sivakuma vs..Challa Anita, alluding to Juveria judgment, held that the request of non-presence of domestic relationship at present can’t be taken as a special case to engage the subdue appeal. The Gauhati HC, in Rahul Biswas versus Khusbu Das  , saw that one can conjure the arrangements of the D.V. Act in spite of Civil Court announcement of divorce, if such episode of domestic violence, remains alive before the recording of the appeal. The Chattisgarh High Court, in Ajay Kumar Reddy and Ors versus State Of Chhattisgarh  held that, in the event of divorcee spouse, the grievance by the divorcee wife under the arrangements of the Act, will be viable so far it identifies with divorced husband for legal obligations emerging out of the marriage that existed between them at one purpose of time. The Madras High Court, in Varalakshmi versus Selvam  held that once the marriage is conceded and the pronouncement of divorce is conceded, even the divorced spouse is additionally qualified for document an appeal under Domestic Violence
Despite the fact that it was held by the Supreme Court in Juveria that a divorce announcement couldn’t smother the advantages and liabilities streaming out of Domestic Violence Act, numerous High Courts have communicated dissonant notes by recognizing it. Some High Courts have followed the Supreme Court judgment for what it’s worth, yet some others have seen that a Domestic Violence Complaint recorded after divorce isn’t viable. Indeed, even in Juveria, the Supreme Court has not analyzed whether a divorced spouse, whenever held to be an ‘wronged individual’ with the end goal of Domestic Violence Act, can guarantee right to habitation under Section 17, in the house having a place with her ex/In-Laws. ? I trust that this contention will be before long settled in a proper case.