By Prof Upendra Baxi

GOVERNANCE

In 1851, French philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon wrote that to be “gover­ned” is “to be at every operation, at every transaction, noted, registered, enrolled, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorized, admonished, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished. It is, under the pretext of public utility, and in the name of the general interest, to be placed under contribution, trained, ransomed, exploited, monopolized, extorted, squeezed, mystified, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, the first word of complaint, to be repressed, fined, despised, harassed, tracked, abused, clubbed, disarmed, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed; and, to crown all, mocked, ridiculed, outraged, dishonoured. That is government; that is its justice; that is its morality.”¹

Many constitutionally well-off citizens may regard this view as considerably restricted, looking only at despotic, and even barbaric, pathologies of governance. Many others—namely, the high consuming upper middle classes and most citizen bystanders—may regard such governance as necessary evil. But the constitutional underclasses (the dispossessed, disadvantaged, disabled and disenfranchised collectivity) wholly understand these states of affairs and cheat their way into survival, as best as they can, through the everyday reality of law, and the victimage, it causes.

The draconian law in Bihar—the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Amendment Act, 2018²—is a poignant example of what effects dragnet laws can cause. Its assaults on liberty apparently knew no limits as can be seen by the amendments now proposed. Advocates Danish Zubair Khan and Lokendra Malik, along with others, challenged this statutory denial even of anticipatory bail before Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundresh who took the first steps towards pre-legislative assessment (PLA).

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Anyone with an ounce of commonsense would know that enacting large number of offences while keeping the number of judges, police, prosecutors and prisons the same result in a disharmony between tasks and personnel serving the institutions. When the personnel remain disproportionate to the tasks, institutions exceed their coping capabilities and the legal order itself becomes ridden with pervasive perversities. Yet, our legisprudence, jurisprudence and demosprudence seem indifferent to how the law they make will work in life. I used to ruefully say in the late seventies of the last century that if instead of the GDP, GLP (gross legislative product) became the measure of development, then India would count as the most developed society known to humankind! Unfortunately, it so acceleratingly and alarmingly, remains so!

No doubt, there have been some recent stirrings. The post-Bhopal factories; environmental, land acquisition; disaster management and relief laws have valuably crystallised the notion of impact assessment, though it is amended from time to time to serve the ends of “ease of doing businesses”.

There is also some talk about human rights impact assessments. All these are valuable tools and indicators for law, administration, interpretation and enforcement (LAIE, as I used to say to law students).

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Ahead of the winter session of Parliament, 2019, the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, M Venkaiah Naidu, emphasised the need for a detailed Legislative Impact Assessment (LIA). He stated the need for “informed laws” in the country, highlighting the “social, economic, environmental and institutional impacts of legislative proposals”.

Chief Justice NV Ramana, in 2021, on the occasion of Constitution Day, made a fervent plea for LIA, and opined that absence of such studies lead to “big issues” that result in over-burdening the courts.

Most recently, Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundresh concertised all this by asking the Nitish Kumar government to collect data on the number of prosecutions and cases pending in different courts under the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Amendment Act, 2018.

The Bihar law resulted in district courts and other courts and even the Patna High Court reeling with bail cases, with one-third of its judicial time already invested in handling them. Overcrowding in prisons had noticeably increased, given the bail denial.

The Bench, directing the Bihar government to file the report by April 25, 2022, said that the government should have thought about the fallout of its policy decision before bringing the law.³

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VARIOUS MEANINGS OF IMPACT

So far, the Supreme Court of India (SCI) has acted quickly to ameliorate “choking” of courts by over criminalisation of cases and vacancies lying unfilled in statutory fora. The Bihar case related to the adverse impact of a specific type of criminal statute on the administration of criminal justice. The state is asked briefly to show the numbers of offenders already booked and prosecutions pending now. Certainly, strict pro-bail polices will solve this important problem of person-power planning.  

But should all criminal law statues require such LIA, retrospectively or prospectively? The present state of pendency of investigation, pre-trial detentions given the bail policy, the delays in trial, conviction and punishment and wrongful prosecutions, altogether suggest a continuing ongoing and retrospective PLA.

The second type of meaning of impact would be compliance with adjudicatory orders and directions. India-wide studies of compliance are lacking, and were recently illustrated with regard to SCI directions concerning constitutional voidness of Section 67-B of the Information Act, 2000.⁴ 

The third type of impact relates to acts of interpretation of the Constitution by the judicial discovery or rediscovery of fundamental rights and of what we may call rights declared under Article 136 and 142 rights.  These contribute to new types of socialisation litigation and many a new jurisdiction in the SCI.

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As far back as July ’87, Justice DA Desai-chaired Law Commission of India submitted a judicial “manpower planning” report which bemoaned this phenomenon (incidentally, I was proud to contribute informally to its text) of  “…the overall lack of attention to this problem on the part of political parties,  press, social activists and the Bar. None of these groups have shown any effective will to campaign for adequate manpower planning for the Indian Judiciary, even while using the services of the Judiciary quite effectively for their own purposes from time to time. It must also be added that Judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court of India, sitting or retired, have also not lent their weight to this constitutional cause in any major way. In other words, adequate reorganisation of the Indian Judiciary is at the one and the same time everybody’s concern and, therefore, nobody’s concern”.

Despite this report, the idea of judicial impact statement has not found favour with the SCI and the Executive. But when courts legislate, they often do, they create new normativities and justifiably add to the burdens and costs of administration of justice. Enforcement and administration of rights integrity structures entail time, person-power, money and governance costs and these are gracefully borne by a grateful democratic citizenry.

TOWARD A CONCLUSION

These notes touch only, howsoever important, one aspect of the problem—the issues raised by the device of PLA. The impact of law on society and of society on law presents a different set of issues even granting that both legislative and judicial processes and institutions signify essentially social dimensions of law and justice (to evoke a title from Julius Stone). Any social and cultural study of these processes must study both symbolic and instrumental dimensions of the legal act or omission.⁵

Moreover, the social life of law (practices and conducts) occurs as much, if not more, outside courtrooms and on other sites. There are also comparative dimensions of legal cultures and the ontic (world shaping) global normative civilizations, which variously impact human and social lives. It might be reasonable to devise nuanced forms of PLA, but issues of wider social impact remain elusive and beyond the efforts of the Bar and the Bench.⁶

The author is an internationally-renowned law scholar, an acclaimed teacher and a well-known writer

¹Samuel Hayim Brody, Martin Buber’s Theopolitics 34 (2018),(Quoting Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, The General Idea of The Revolution in The Nineteenth Century).

²Shivam Sharma, “Prohibition and Rights”, India Legal (pp 40-42), provides a very significant account of the law and proposed amendments. It would seem that the proposed amendments to the Bihar Act would exclude arrest for the first offence altogether, substituting it by a ‘reasonable’ fine. What would be ‘reasonable’ would, one hopes, depend on the socio-economic status of the first offender. CJI Ramana characterised the law as marked by “a lack of foresight”. (February 7, 2022).

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³The Attorney General of India himself suggested in Damodar S Prabhu vs Sayed Babalal (on May 3, 2011) in an unusual suo motu proceedings that “interests of justice would indeed be better served if parties resorted to compounding as a method to resolve their disputes at an early stage instead of engaging in protracted litigation before several forums, thereby causing undue delay, expenditure and strain on part of the judicial system” and judicial intervention was aimed at diverting the cheque bounce cases which “choked” the Court. Incidentally, the same Bench had insisted that UOI conduct a legislative impact assessment of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (COPRA). The Impact Study Report noted a 6.3% increase in complaints filed at the district commissions. Considering the 45% unfilled vacancies at the district level, the Report suggested a revision in the pecuniary jurisdiction and increase in the number of benches.

⁴See, Upendra Baxi ’A Sudden Flood of Mutiny?”. India Legal, August 2, 2021.

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⁵See, Upendra Baxi, “Upendra Baxi, “Who Bothers about the Supreme Court? The Problem of Impact of Judicial Decisions” Journal of the Indian Law Insti­tute. 24:4, 842 (1982). Interestingly, no one bothered about this. So, reiterated and updated it in Dimensions of Impact Analysis.” in Manoj Kumar Sinha & Deepa Kharb(ed.) Legal Research Methodology 182-190. (Lexis Nexis, New Delhi, 2016).

 ⁶See, Gerald Rosenberg. “Romancing the Court”, 89 Boston University Law Review 563- 579 (2009) and the literature cited in Baxi, above.

The Supreme Court on Monday quashed a writ petition filed by a Karnataka-based lawyer seeking a direction to the Central government to take action against the People’s Republic of China for spreading Covid-19 as a biological weapon.

The Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M. Sundresh, while stating that the petition was nothing but a publicity stunt, held that a chosen government was in place to do the needful in this matter. The Bench noted that the plea to act against China has very wide international ramifications and that it cannot look at such ramifications when there is an  elected government.  

It is for the government to take action if there is cause to take it in the first place. The court noted that this was a petition to gain press attention and hoped the media will not oblige the petitioner.

The Court noted that the petitioner wanted certain additions to the NDMA plan against the Covid virus to introduce virgin coconut oil in the regimen. The Court said even if the petitioner says a senior scientist had researched into the properties of virgin coconut oil that could dissolve the virus, not everyone can claim to have a solution to deal with the virus and file a petition under Article 32.

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The Bench observed that the petitioner could make suggestions to the authority concerned.

The petitioner apprised the Court that he had filed the petition to provide respite to the common man  from the grim Covid-19 situation.

By Prof Upendra Baxi

We are accustomed to prolix and profound constitutional homilies from the Supreme Court of India (SCI). These are, of course, very crucial. But the very short order delivered last week by Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundresh in Nupur J. Sharma vs State of West Bengal is also constitutionally poignant and perennial. It directs attention to civility and dignity of political discourse, which the norms of the Constitution command.

Purists may, indeed, trivially argue that there was no scope for the judicial observations given the fact that the State had indicated that it would withdraw from prosecution of all criminal cases registered by the West Bengal police against editors and journalists of web portal OpIndia. But they would miss the offensive act comprised of the fact that FIRs were lodged in the first place! These were launched against OpIndia editor Nupur J Sharma, her husband Vaibhav Sharma, portal founder and CEO Rahul Roushan, and former editor of its Hindi division Ajeet Bharti. The cases invoked charges relating to promoting enmity between religious groups, outraging religious feelings, attempt to provoke breach of peace and defamation. Despite the State’s gesture, the SCI took a welcome opportunity to make a number of pertinent general observations on the matter. It is the settled law that the considered observations, (obiter dicta) by the SCI are binding law.

The brief observations should be carefully read by all citizens, who in the old Aristotelian sense, are beings who know how to be ruled and how to rule. The Registry of the SCI will be well advised to send a certified copy of the order to all High Courts and district courts in India, chief ministers and chief secretaries of all states and Union Territories, the Prime Minister’s Office, all political parties registered with the Election Commission, police chiefs and the media for wider and constant sharing. The Prasar Bharati and the mass media, especially social media, should be able to devise ways on every national day (Independence Day, Republic Day, Martyr’s Day and Constitution Day) for wider sharing. The observations should also be forwarded to the Bar Council, bar associations, judicial academies and law schools in India.

What did the Court (as per Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul) momentously urge? The SCI explicitly stated that it was “not inclined to let go off the Opportunity of saying something which is troubling the society and the Court the debasement in the dialogue” across the country. Democratic constitutionalism does not consist in soliloquies of power but rests on dialogue between the rulers and the ruled, which constantly interrupts power in all its unfolding. This “debasement” of dialogue is now a national problem, though it has been inflicted upon the constitutional have-nots since Independence.

I refer here to the National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) who regularly archive the episodes of uncivil conduct and coercion and force of the dominant. The NHRI (and their state counterparts)—Human Rights Commissions, Women’s and Child Commissions, Disabilities Commission, Law Commissions and Scheduled Castes and Tribes Commission, for example, occasionally even swing into action and award compensation for the harms done. And reams of paper in citizens’ reports and acres of space in the electronic media dwell on the incivility of the “VVIP” culture in public life. It is most precious to have now a judicial reminder that the constitutional assurance of the basic right of dignity of all citizens includes the integral idea of civility in use of power. In fact, this is of the essence of good constitutional governance. “Reverence for the Constitution” and “constitutional renaissance” remain possible only by restoring the dignity of public discourse.¹

How did the SCI bench manage to say this in such a short compass? First, it urged for at least a modicum of civility in public life. The SCI lamented the tendency “to use the State’s powers to intimidate journalists for reporting on something which is already in public domain or is in exercise of their right to free speech and expression”. Second, it expressed a strong concern at “the debasement in the dialogue which is taking place” and which “needs introspection from the political class across the country”. No doubt, in “a country which prides itself on its diversity, there are bound to be different perceptions and opinions, which would include political opinions”, and that difference is “the very essence of a democracy”. At the same time, one may add, debasement diminishes the dignity of the other, which is prohibited by the Constitution under Article 21’s rights to personal liberty and life. Debasement of discourse also offends the human right to privacy as a core of life with dignity.

Third, indeed, the threat or use of state force may serve as an indicator of debasement of political discourse. As the Court said: “State force should never be used to either browbeat a political opinion or the journalists suffer the consequences of what is already in the public domain.” Certainly, show or use of force against co-citizens and persons without a justifiable cause for it constitutes a grave breach of constitutional civility and even of basic fundamental rights.

Fourth, while noting with full force that “at times their exchanges may get heated” in the very nature of things and by the “very nature of the job required to be performed by the political class”, the Court alerted the constitutional elites that lest it should “explode” into utter public lawlessness and societal disorder such difference “in perception … be expressed in better language”.  The SCI, however, added that “this does not take away the responsibility of the journalists in how they report the matter, more so in a Twitter age”. Civility is not inimical to social responsibility. Urging the “political class to be more tolerant of each other’s opinion in their critiques”, the Court said that the “debasement in dialogue has become a chief problem of democracy”. If not checked in time, this could lead to the very demise of constitutional democracy.

Associated with “debasement” of political discourse and incivility of power, I may add (with respect) that the concept of non-humiliation is deeply embedded in Articles 14, 15, l6, 17, 23 and 24 of the Constitution. “Compassion for every living being” is also a fundamental duty of every citizen; a duty to avoid practices derogatory of the dignity of women is also one such duty. And to shun mediocrity in exercise of power under the law and Constitution is also proscribed by Article 51-A because there is a fundamental duty to develop a spirit of “excellence in all walks of life, singular and collective”. A lazy or wicked threat or use of legal power offends the Constitution; this most mediocre political practice offends, being an enemy of constitutional excellence. Such performance of power stands altogether ruled out by Article 51-A’s fundamental duty of non-humiliation.²

—The author is an internationally-renowned law scholar, an acclaimed teacher and a well-known writer

¹As I have said in my article “Revolutionary Judiciary” (India Legal, February 14, 2020) referring to Government of NCT of Delhi vs Union of India & Another, Para 5 (per Dipak Misra, A.K. Sikri, and A. Khanwilkar JJ.; 2018, Justice Dipak Misra has   bequeathed several new, and enriching,  concepts such as “constitutional renaissance”, “constitutional trust” and “pragmatic and purposive interpretation”.

²See, Upendra Baxi, “Humiliation and Justice”, Chapter 5 in Gopal Guru (Ed) Humiliation: Claims and Context (New Delhi; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011).

The Supreme Court on Wednesday held Rajiv Dahiya, MD of Rajasthan-based NGO Suraz India Trust, guilty of contempt of Court for not complying with its earlier order of depositing exemplary cost of Rs 25 lakh for casting “imaginary and scandalous accusations” on the judiciary.

The bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M. Sundresh said, “His actions to scandalise the court cannot be countenance.” The Court added that it will conduct hearing on the final sentence on October 7

On September 8, 2021, the Bench reserved its order on whether contempt proceedings should be initiated against Dahiya. The respondent judgment debtor and the contemnor in the contempt proceedings had appeared before the court in pursuance to the bailable warrants issued by the Apex Court. 

After the hearing, the Apex Court had granted three days time to the chairperson to file an unconditional apology to the court or withdraw all what he has said.

“In the end, as per usual practice in prior proceedings, the petitioner stated that he wants to tender an unconditional apology seeking to withdraw all what he has said. We have put to him that he has the liberty to file what he pleases within three days and we will take that into consideration while passing our orders. Judgment reserved,”

-noted the bench of Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice M.M. Sundresh. 

The Supreme Court had issued contempt notice on July 9, 2021 to the chairperson for not depositing the cost of Rs 25 lakh for repeatedly misusing the jurisdiction of the top court. During the hearing today, Dahiya appeared before the court virtually and requested for some time to seek legal advice, which was denied. Subsequently, there were some prayers submitted by the NGO chairperson to allow for a mercy petition and requested that it’s impossible to make the payment, as he had no access to such resources.

“There is no such mercy petition and you are beyond that, as you have invited problems for yourself. You think if you throw mud on people, people will back off, if you have assets, it (the cost) will be recovered,”

-the court retorted. 

The court also denied recalling the orders made for the recovery of amount from personal proceeds. The court said, “If you had apologised, you would not be in this position, but now you have to learn a lesson.”

Dahiya shared an example of a Japanese detention centre, where a man broke out of the jail five times just to draw attention and notice of the authorities. In the same way, he said he wanted to bring to the notice of the courts that no one could make false statements in courts. “I just wanted to draw attention of the courts; nobody has a right to make false statement in courts. I made this NGO for this purpose only to bring false examples out.”

“What you have done you think is right, but we feel is wrong,” the court said and opined that the purpose of forming NGO may be right, but there is a method to redress a grievance.

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Justice Kaul, while calling Rajiv Dahiya a “Gyaani” in the subjects of law, said at last, he cannot permit the same to be done.

ASG Aishwarya Bhati respectfully submitted that nine times the matter was heard, but there was complete evasion of information on employment and assets, which is scandalising the court.

The court asked senior counsel Manish Singhvi, “He has to be mentally tested.”

The court also denied the petitioner any kind of review, which was his constitutional right. Dahiya accepted his mistakes and said he was willing to submit an unconditional apology.

Background 

The Bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hemant Gupta in a miscellaneous application (2020) in case of Suraz India Trust vs UoI, arising out of order passed in Writ Petition of 2016, dated May 6, 2021, asked the state (Union of India) that the petitioner in person qua Chairman of NGO (Suraj India Trust) has still not deposited Rs 25 lakh as cost imposed by the then then three-judge bench, namely CJI Jagdish Singh Khehar and Justices D.Y. Chandrachud and Sanjay Kishan Kaul for wasting the judicial time of the apex court by filing 64 frivolous petitions, both before various High Courts and the apex court.

The Union of India had apprised the court that disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the petitioner in person, thereof the bench directed the state to initiate fresh steps in recovering the costs from the petitioner, that could be gathered from the arrears of land revenue.  

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The Bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hrishikesh Roy, vide order February 12, 2021, noticed the fact that the application for modification filed by petitioner for waiving the cost awarded to the petitioner in person, was outrightly rejected on January 5, 2017.  Further, the details of immovable and movable assets were sought by the apex court from the petitioner, but he failed to furnish them. Seeing the indiscretion and conduct of petitioner by laying tricks upon the court, the apex court issued bailable warrant against petitioner Rajiv Dahiya for the sum of Rs 25,000 with one surety of like amount.  

The order dated April 12, 2021 indicate that Senior Advocate Manish Singhvi, Counsel for the state, appeared and court asked him to obtain instructions as to nature of employment of petitioner in person and whether all activities  being carried out by petitioner are permissible or not  while he is drawing salary from the state since the petitioner is in government job.

Genesis of Writ Petition (2016)

The following petition came up before the 3 judges Bench (Supra)  in the month of April 2017. The court had a view that such petition does not disclose any cause in interest of public nature, and as such the court granted him liberty to not file such PILs which is not in interest of public cause. Ample opportunity was given to the petitioner to make voluntary statement regarding not filing such petitions, nevertheless , the suggestion put forward by the court was declined by him. Several representations were sent by petitioner to the then President of India making inappropriate remarks against SC judges, Rajasthan High court and other court judges as well. Such letter contained allegation about the registry of Supreme Court also.

The Supreme Court on Monday imposed a cost of Rs 25000 on the state of Himachal Pradesh for filing an appeal after a delay of 650 days against the acquittal of a man convicted and sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment in a POCSO case. 

A bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hrishikesh Roy reprimanded the Himachal Pradesh government and imposed a fine of Rs 25,000 for showing reluctance in delaying filing petition before the apex court where the case was of serious allegations in nature. The State government of Himachal Pradesh moved apex court after 650 days  challenging the acquittal of Gorkha Ram  passed by High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla.

The Supreme Court ordered this fine amount to be paid to the authorities responsible for the delay in filing the appeal. Apart from this, the Bench also ordered the state government to investigate the matter and fix the responsibility in the appeal. During the hearing of the case, the court told the public prosecutor that there was a delay of six hundred and fifty days in filing the appeal in this case. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul asked the counsel of State that “can you tell when the corona 2019 or 20 came?” The counsel for the state government replied that I will not be able to say for sure. 

Justice Kaul asked what is all this? Such negligence of these officers in appeal. You do not know when the corona epidemic came, the delay in appeal for so many days is not being clarified. The issue of gravity cannot be made a ground for appeal. Why not fix the responsibility of the officials for this?

Gorkha, the respondent herein was convicted by Sessions court of Kangra, Dharamshala for the offence punishable under section 5(m) and 5(n) of POCSO Act, 2012 and sentenced to undergo R.I. for 10 years  along with fine of Rs. 20,000/-.

In a nutshell the facts of the case are that Komal Parihar was apprised in the meeting of Mahila Mandal at Bhali by some women of the village present there that the appellant Gorkha had been torturing mentally and physically his minor daughters after the death of his wife. Gorkha allegedly tried to develop physical relations with his elder daughter. A FIR against Gorkha got lodged on 9.07.2016. In the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of the victim recorded by the Investigating Officer, she, however, has completely ruled out the penetrative sexual assault.

The High court was of the view that Investigating Agency has not made any effort to conduct investigation from different angle to rule out the possibility of false implication of accused before filing the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. in the court. The investigation rather has been conducted in a casual and routine manner to implicate the accused in this case by hook and crook.

Vide order dated 5.12.2018 , the High Court vide order before setting aside Sessions Court order by acquitting Gorkha from all the charges directed State/Police Department as well as Prosecution Department through learned Advocate General, State of Himachal Pradesh to take remedial steps such as imparting training to the Investigators/Prosecutors and all other duty holders. And also observed that trial court carried away without ascertaining the genuiness and authenticity of allegations levelled against him after appreciation of the evidences with great caution and circumspection.

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The High Court after examining the evidences ,exercising its power as an Appellate Court opined that the prosecution has falsely implicated the accused in this case and thereby not only tarnished the reputation of the accused, who happens to be the father of the victim, but also put a question mark on the pious relations between father and a daughter.

The Supreme Court bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hemant Gupta on Thursday directed the state to take steps to recover the Rs 25 lakh cost that had been imposed by the court on Suraj India Trust for filing 64 frivolous petitions both before various high courts and the Apex Court. That cost had been imposed by the then bench of Chief Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar, Justices DY Chandrachud and Sanjay Kishan Kaul in writ petition no. 880 of 2016 for wasting the judicial time of the apex court.

The Trust (or its chairman Rajiv Dhaiya) has not deposited the amount.

During hearing, the Union of India apprised the court that disciplinary proceedings have been instituted against the petitioner in person. The bench then directed the state to initiate fresh steps in recovering the costs from the petitioner, that could be gathered from the arrears of land revenue. 

In September 2020, the apex court issued notice to the original petitioner, directing him to pay the cost of Rs 25 lakh pursuant to the order of May 1, 2017, passed by the then bench led by CJI Khehar. The court had discouraged the manner and indiscretion adopted by so many individuals while filing PILs before the Supreme Court, “just like the petitioner in person, Rajiv Dhaiya has adopted in the present case.” He was further ordered to deposit such amount with the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Welfare Trust, within 3 months from date of order. In case if he fails to pay the cost such shall be recovered from the personal assets of the petitioner.

The bench of Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice Hrishikesh Roy, vide order of 12.02.2021 noticed the fact that the application for modification filed by petitioner for waiving the cost awarded to petitioner in person, was outright rejected on 5.1.2017.  Furthermore, details of immovable and movable assets were sought by the Apex Court  from the petitioner, but he failed to furnish that. Seeing the conduct of the petitioner, the apex court issued a bailable warrant against Dhaiya for the sum of Rs 25,000 with one surety of like amount. 

The order dated 12.04.2021 indicate that Senior Advocate Manish Singhvi, counsel for the state, appeared and the court asked him to obtain instructions as to nature of employment of petitioner in person and whether all activities being carried out by the petitioner are permissible or not, while he is drawing a salary from the state since the petitioner is in a government job.

Genesis of writ petition no. (880 of 2016)

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The following petition came up before the 3 judges bench (supra) in the month of April 2017. The court had a view that such petition does not disclose any cause in interest of public nature, and as such the court granted him liberty to not file such PILs which is not in interest of public cause. Ample opportunity was given to the Petitioner to make voluntary statement regarding not filing such petitions. Nevertheless, the suggestion put forward by the court was declined by him. Several representations were sent by the petitioner to the then President of India, making inappropriate remarks against SC judges, the Rajasthan High court and other court judges as well. Such letter contained allegation about the registry of the Supreme Court also.

Source: ILNS

The Supreme Court has imposed a cost of Rs 1 lakh on a tenant and directed him to pay the rent of 11 years on the basis of market rate to the landlord within three months.

A two-judge bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and R. Subhash Reddy said, “This is a classical case of how civil proceedings can be prolonged ad infinitum, causing grave injustice to one of the parties.”

The court has noted, “The landlord filed suit for possession which succeeded right till this Court. The execution proceedings filed in the year 2009 has dragged on for 12 years. The petitioner before us filed objections in the execution proceedings on 26.03.2010. It was his contention that he was running a business in the decretal shop in partnership with the tenant from 1980.”

“This application filed by the petitioner itself was an abuse of process of law,” said the Apex Court. 

The court said, “We are not satisfied with merely dismissing the special leave petition as  some signal must be sent to discourage this nature of litigation. We, thus while dismissing the SLP, impose the following directions :

1. The execution be satisfied within a period of 15 days from this order being placed before the trial Court.
2. Damages be computed by the executing Court at the market rates against the petitioner from the date of filing the objection i.e. 26.03.2010 till possession is taken and this process be completed within a period of three months.
3. The petitioner for wastage of judicial time and for dragging on the proceedings be burdened with costs of Rs 1 lakh to be paid to the respondent within the same period of three months.

Prabal Dutta, predecessor-in-interest of respondent No.2, filed Title Suit No.93/94 of 2004 against one Rabindra Nath Sinha stating, inter alia, that the said Rabindra Nath Sinha was inducted as a lessee under an agreement for 21 years sometime in 1967. After expiry of the period of lease, the original plaintiff filed the suit for eviction against the said Rabindra Nath Sinha, recovery of possession and other incidental reliefs from the suit premises. The said suit was decreed by a judgment and decree dated 17th August, 2005 by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 6th Court at Alipore. The defendant/lessee challenged the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court successively up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. However, the appeals filed by the original defendant /tenant were dismissed on contest affirming the judgment and decree of eviction passed by the trial Court.

After the conclusion of the initial legal battle in the form of suits and appeals, the plaintiff/decree holder put the decree in execution in the year 2009.

The present appellant, namely Debashish Sinha, entered appearance in the said execution proceeding on 26th March, 2010 claiming himself as a nephew of the original defendant/judgment debtor and filed an application under Order XXI Rule 97, 99 and 100 read with Sections 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure contending, inter alia, that he has been running a business in a decretal shop room under the name and style “The Wardrobe” since 1977 with the original defendant/judgment debtor.

The Calcutta High Court had dismissed the appeal filed by Debasish Sinha. The Court had held that, “In the instant case relationship of lessor and lessee between the decree holder and the original judgement-debtor was established up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The present appellant is a ranked third party in respect of landlord-tenant relationship and he cannot claim independent tenancy on the basis of a partnership agreement executed by and between him and the original judgement-debtor.”

Read the order here;

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