The Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court while dismissing the petition said that making repetitive representations would not dilute the effect of undue delay in filing the writ petition and will not create any fresh cause of action.
The Division Bench of Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya Justice Subhash Vidyarthi passed this order while hearing a special appeal filed by Urmila Devi Pal.
By instituting the Special Appeal filed under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, the appellant – petitioner has challenged the order dated 19.04.2023, passed by the Single Judge dismissing the Writ, which was filed by the appellant-petitioner for quashing of the order dated 13.01.2023 passed by Director, Bal Vikas Seva Evam Pushtahar, rejecting her representation dated 29.09.2022.
The facts of the case, as pleaded in the writ petition, are that the petitioner was appointed to the post of Mukhya Sevika on 31.05.1995 and she joined her duties on 25.04.1996.
On 15.06.2005, the petitioner was transferred to Sultanpur. The petitioner challenged the transfer order by filing Writ Petition and on 25.07.2005 an interim order was passed in the aforesaid writ petition that the petitioner shall not be relieved in pursuance of the transfer order.
The writ petition was finally disposed of by means of a judgment and order dated 30.09.2005, directing that if the petitioner makes any representation within a period of ten days for change of the place of posting in accordance with the Government Order dated 13.07.2000, she will be accommodated in any of the blocks in District Lucknow, except the home block, or in any block in any adjoining district and till then no coercive measure shall be taken against her. In furtherance of the aforesaid judgment and order dated 30.09.2005, the petitioner was given posting in District Lucknow.
The petitioner filed another writ petition, bearing Writ Petition, raising her grievance of non-payment of some dues of salary, medical leave and benefit of 6th Pay Commission recommendations, which was disposed off by means of a judgment and order dated 04.09.2014 directing that the Director, Child Development and Nutrition, Lucknow should take a decision on the petitioner’s representation.
It was further stated in the order that the benefit of the 6th Pay Commission’s recommendations had already been given to the petitioner.
The petitioner thereafter filed Writ claiming salary for the period 02.03.2001 to 31.10.2001, salary and other allowances for the period 16.05.1998 to 01.03.2001, assured career progression for the year 2003 and some other dues.
However, after advancing submissions at some length in support of the writ petition, the counsel for the petitioner confined his prayer for issuance of a direction to the Director, Bal Vikas Seva Evam Pushtahar to consider and decide the petitioner’s representation dated 10.08.2022. The Single Judge disposed off the writ petition without entering into the merits of the case by directing the Director, Bal Vikas Seva Evam Pushtahar to consider and decide the petitioner’s representation dated 10.08.2022 with a reasoned and speaking order, in accordance with law.
Regarding the petitioner’s claim for payment of salary for the period 20.06.2005 to 26.10.2006, it has been stated that by means of a letter dated 24.04.2007 sent by the Directorate, the petitioner had been informed that in case she submits a leave application for the period of her absence, the same will be considered in accordance with the rules but the petitioner did not submit any leave application and, therefore, she was not entitled to receive salary of the period of her absence without leave.
Regarding the petitioner’s claim for payment of salary for the period of her suspension, the Director has stated that as per a letter dated 04.01.2023 sent by the District Program Officer, Barabanki, the arrears of salary for the period of suspension (16.05.1998 to 09.02.2001) has been paid to the petitioner by Child Development Project, Pure Dalai, Barabanki.
In respect of the petitioner’s claim for payment of salary of two days in September, 2012 and three days in May, 2013 it has been stated that the petitioner was absent without any information on the aforesaid days and therefore her claim for payment of salary was not found to be proper.
The Single Judge held that earlier the petitioner had filed multiple writ petitions and the subsequent writ petition filed by the petitioner suffers from gross delay and latches, as it had been filed 27 years after accrual of the alleged cause of action. The Single Judge further held that the writ petition had been filed in respect of the stale claim which the petitioner chose not to raise while approaching the court on two earlier occasions by filing two writ petitions. The Single Judge held that the writ petition had been filed raising monetary claims and such a writ petition could not be entertained 27 years after accrual of the cause of action. The Single Judge observed that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed with exemplary cost but the court refrained from imposing cost, keeping in view the fact that the petitioner is a Class III employee, who is on the verge of retirement.
The aforesaid observations were made keeping in view the facts of the cases that the government had utilized the land of the petitioners without payment of compensation. The right to property is a constitutional right protected by Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the Supreme Court had held that the State could not deprive a citizen of his property without sanction of law and in such circumstances, the delay in initiating the litigation would not be an absolute impediment. However, the Supreme Court explicitly observed that there are authorities pertaining to service jurisprudence which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim, the Court observed.
The Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Writ Petition was filed in respect of a continuing cause of action and, therefore, it could not have been dismissed on the ground of delay.
The aforesaid submission also does not have any merit because it is settled law that although there is no limitation prescribed for filing a writ petition, the same should necessarily be filed with reasonable promptitude and merely by making repetitive representations, the conduct of the appellant in not approaching the Court for redressal of her grievance for a very long period, which in the case is more than two decades, cannot be justified and making repetitive representations would not dilute the effect of undue delay in filing the writ petition and will not create any fresh cause of action, the Court said.
“In the case, the appellant had approached the court on two occasions earlier by filing two writ petitions but she chose not to raise her grievances of non-payment of salary for some period between the years 1998 to 2001, which was raised by her in Writ, although cause of action for the same had already accrued to her. The writ petition filed for the reliefs which could have been claimed by the appellant while filing the earlier writ petitions and which were not claimed by her, would be clearly hit by the principles contained in Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the Single Judge that this court would not substitute the reasoning given by the Director in the impugned order.
We are also in agreement with the reason given by the Single Judge for dismissing the writ petition that it had been filed with gross delay and as such it was liable to be dismissed for this reason also.
Therefore, we are not persuaded to take any view other than the view taken by the Single Judge that the writ petition filed by the petitioner in the year 2003 regarding her grievances against nonpayment of salary for various intermittent periods starting from the period 1998, suffers from gross delay and latches and also that the order under challenge in the writ petition was a well reasoned order and the court would not substitute the reasoning given by the Director in the order”, the Court further observed while dismissing the petition.