The Supreme Court has sought response of the Registrar Generals of all High Courts on a petition seeking direction to the states to establish ‘Gram Nyayalayas’ as per the Gram Nyayalayas Act 2008.

The Bench of Justice S. Abdul Nazeer and Justice V. Ramasubramanian directed to add all High Courts as respondents in the case, after noting that their presence was necessary for adjudicating the matter.

The order was passed on a PIL filed by the National Federation of Societies for Fast Justice seeking the implementation of the Gram Nyayalayas Act.

Representing the petitioner, Advocate Prashant Bhushan contended that though the Act was passed almost 14 years ago, many States have not established even a single Gram Nyayalayas. 

Bhushan said the Act had proposed establishment of village courts, which would not be bound by the rigid procedure of CPC and CrPC to decide the small cases of specified nature.

The Counsel said the Central government had noted that the establishment of Gram Nyayalayas by the States was not mandatory as the Act used the word ‘may’ instead of ‘shall’.

He further said that the Court has interpreted ‘may’ to mean ‘shall’ in certain situations. Since access to justice was a fundamental right, may should be interpreted as shall in the context of Gram Nyayalayas, added Bhushan.

He pointed out that more than 50 percent of the population in the country were not able to afford lawyers and approach regular courts. This was the reason for enacting the courts at village level for fast adjudication of small cases.

As per Bhushan, only a few states had implemented the Act, which included Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Kerala.

He said the government of Himachal Pradesh had opposed the establishment of Gram Nyayalayas, despite recommendation made by the High Court in this regard. Besides, the States of Bihar and Jharkhand were also opposing the Act, while the state of Tamil Nadu was yet to establish a single Gram Nyayalaya.

(Case title: National Federation of Societies for Fast Justice versus Union of India and others)

The High Court for the State of Telangana, Hyderabad organized Telangana State Judicial Officers Conference, 2022 from April 15-16, 2022, many distinguished speakers were called, including Chief Minister Minister K. Chandrasekhar Rao, Chief Justice of India NV Ramana, Supreme Court Justice V. Ramasubramanian and Minister A. Indrakaran Reddy.

In the inaugural session, Telangana CM K. Chandrasekhar Rao said, “I feel the city Courts are overloaded with work, I request you humbly sirs that Judges posted there are increased & Magistrate courts are also increased down the line so burden on courts is reduced.”

Speaking on the occasion of the inaugural session of the Telangana State Judicial Officers Conference 2022, Chief Justice of India N.V. Ramana said that the purpose behind organizing this Conference is to introspect about various factors governing the administration of justice and to discover ways and means to bring qualitative improvement in the system. Strengthening the subordinate Judiciary is the need of the hour.  I would like to share with you some of my thoughts in this regard.

CJI told the judicial officers of districts to “create congenial atmosphere” for litigants and “remember human aspect” while adjudicating cases.

Coming back to today’s event, the greatest strength of the Indian judiciary is the faith of people in the institution. Being the Court of First Instance, it is your responsibility to ensure that the litigants remain satisfied. Litigants form an opinion on the judiciary based on the conduct of Officers / Courts in the Subordinate Judiciary. This casts a great responsibility on your shoulders.

The CJI also emphasized that we should try to empathise with members of minorities and weaker sections of society and “Treat everyone with respect.”

The Chief Justice said the judiciary “was a check on excesses of the executive”, and the judicial officers need to keep themselves updated with the changes in law and keep abreast of developments in other sectors like science and technology.

In case of Telangana, we could go a step ahead. The strength of High Court has gone up from 24 to 42. The working strength has gone up from 12 to 29. After I assumed office, so far 17 fresh appointments were made. You all know, out of those 17, 11 are from your fraternity.

Talking on the financial aspects, he said that “financial soundness was crucial for the judicial officers to give their best.” He added that he has spoken to the Pay Commission recently and that “good news” was round the corner.

CJI Ramana did not forget to thank Chief Minister K. Chandrasekhar Rao for the latter’s quick response in extending all facilities to the judicial officers.

Telangana High Court Chief Justice Satish Chandra Sharma said that a there is a rising trend of indiscipline which has crept in among judicial officers. He added “Senior counsels are being ill treated, and many officers are not punctual that not only delays the work but also gives a bad name to the system,” CJ Sharma said in his inaugural address.

CJ Satish Chandra Sharma drew everyone’s attention to the 8 lakh pending cases in district courts. He said “better and modern judicial infrastructure” was the need of the hour for speedy disposal of cases.

Everyone agreed that the judicial officers were required to play a pro-active role in clearing pending cases.

Read CJI Ramana’s full Speech

The Supreme Court will continue its hearing on appeal filed by Manoj Kumar Tiwari & Vijender Gupta Bhartiya Janta Party leaders against the Delhi High Court order which had dismissed their petition seeking quashing of summons issued to them in a defamation case filed by Deputy CM Manish Sisodia.

A bench led by Justice Hemant Gupta and Justice V. Ramasubramanian will hear the matter.

The Top Court in January last year had stayed the defamation proceedings against BJP MP Manoj Tiwari and MLA Vijender Gupta in a defamation case filed by Delhi Deputy CM Manish Sisodia.

Delhi High Court judge, Justice Anu Malhotra had on December 17, 2020, dismissed the petition filed by BJP leaders challenging the Summons issued to them in a defamation case filed against them by Manish Sisodia.

Sisodia had filed a criminal complaint against Manoj Tiwari, Vijender Gupta and others for allegedly making false allegations of corruption to the tune of Rs 2,000 crore with regard to the construction of classrooms in a government school.

Besides Tiwari, and Gupta the complaint was filed against BJP MPs Hans Raj Hans and Pravesh Verma, former MLA Manjinder Singh Sirsa and party spokesperson Harish Khurana.

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (ACMM) Vishal Pahuja had asked Tiwari, Pravesh Verma, Hansraj Hans, Vijender Gupta, and Harish Khurana to appear before him in connection with the case.

Sisodia had filed the complaint under Section 200 of CrPC for the commission of offences under Section 499 and 500 read with Sections 34 and 35 of IPC for making a false and defamatory statement in print, electronic and social media.

Sisodia stated that all the allegations made by the BJP leaders jointly and individually were false, defamatory and derogatory with an intention to harm and damage his reputation and goodwill.

“We are exposing a scam in which Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal and Deputy Chief Minister Manish Sisodia are involved. An RTI application has revealed that extra Rs 2,000 crore was given for constructions of rooms in schools that could’ve been constructed in only Rs 892 crore. Thirty-four contractors were given the task including their relatives,” Tiwari had said at a press conference.

By Sahil Chandra

The Supreme Court has set aside the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment of three people under Section 302 IPC, noting that investigation was faulty and not carried out with the intention of unearthing the truth, but for burying the same fathom deep, for extraneous considerations and that it was denied to turn the informant and her family members as accused and allow the real culprits named in the FIR to escape. (Madhav vs State of Madhya Pradesh)

In this case, the apex court, while exercising its wide powers under Article 142, set aside the conviction of one of the accused who didn’t even file the appeal before the Court and set him free.

The bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and V. Ramasubramanian said, “This is a case where we have disbelieved, in entirety, the story of the prosecution. Therefore, to deny the benefit of the said conclusion to A-1 merely on ground of a technicality that he is not on appeal would be to close our eyes to a gross injustice, especially when we are empowered under Article 142 to do complete justice.”

The Supreme Court held that the investigation proceeded in the reverse gear right from the beginning. The Supreme Court concluded that “instead of proceeding in pursuit of truth, (the investigation) had proceeded towards burying the truth.”

The accused were Madhav, Sahodra Bai and Raju. Madhav and Sahodra appealed to the Supreme Court in two separate appeals that were heard and decided together. The offences were those of Section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for which they were sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2500/- by the Sessions Court and confirmed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh vide a common order dated 19 th September. The appellants were represented by Mr. Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad and Mr. Amit Arjariya.

The Incident

The story sought to be established by the prosecution was that on a fateful night of 13 th May 2018 at 10:30, the three accused namely Sahodra Bai, Raju (her husband and brother of the deceased), and Madhav (her brother), in furtherance of common intention attacked and killed one Pappu @ Nand Kishore, the brother of Raju, with a knife and lathis. Thereafter, to cover up, Sahodra Bai, took him to a government hospital and informed the police implicating two other person, Ruia Yadav and KailashYadav. She was additionally charged with Sections 211 and 194 IPC, but acquitted on that account.

Evidence adduced and the Supreme Court’s findings

Eye-Witness Account: Evidence of PW4 and PW5

They were related to Ruia and Kailash who had been named by Sahodra Bai. In their cross-examination, they were declared hostile as they contradicted themselves from their earlier statement made to the police by stating that Madhav was not present on the spot of occurrence. The Sessions Court believed their testimony in so far as it related to the presence of Raju and Sahodra but disbelieved their evidence as regards to the alleged assault.

The High Court, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, arbitrarily treated their testimony as independent witness despite being termed hostile and that too solely on the ground of corroboration of the testimony of a star witness whose testimony was considered partly.

Evidence of Ruia Yadav and Kailash Yadav

The Sessions Court disbelieved the testimony of Kailash in entirety but accepted a portion of the statement of Ruia regarding an argument of Raju with the deceased nearly two hours before the occurrence on the basis of corroboration by the mother of the deceased. The quarrel was over non payment of Rs 250 given to the deceased by Ruia, wherein Raju got injured.

It was alleged that thereafter the three accused attacked the deceased. The Trial Court relied upon this testimony based on the corroboration of the mother of the deceased in this regard. However, the Supreme Court observed that she had only stated that Raju only questioned the deceased as to why he had not repaid and that there was no reason for Raju to take up the cause of Ruia and go to the extent of committing the murder of his own brother.

Evidence of Sapna Yadav

Sapna Yadav, aged 16, was considered as a star witness. Her statement was recorded by the police after 21 days of the incident. She not only claimed knowledge of the arrest of the original accused in the FIR but also stated that after the incident there was a strike in the mohalla where the persons of Yadav caste pressurized the police into releasing them. This fact was not considered by the Courts below.

The Supreme Court also noted that the evidence of this ‘star witness’ was unbelievable as it was taken after 21 days, and moreover if her evidence was to be believed it should only be done in totality. This observation was made in relation to the aspect of political pressure influencing the investigation that was overlooked by the Trial Court and the High Court.

Seizure of weapons from the houses of the accused

The prosecution further relied upon the seizure of the knife and lathis from the house. In this regard, the Supreme Court considered two aspects. Firstly, that the witness of the seizure memo turned hostile and secondly, that there was unwarranted reliance on report of the Forensic Science Laboratory.

The seizure memo of the weapons used was purportedly made in the presence of the witness who did not support the prosecution. One of the witness also stated that his signature on the seizure memo was taken outside the hotel near the police station. Despite being termed hostile, the High Court gave credence to the seizure by holding that he had admitted the signatures in the seizure memo and memorandum statement.

Further, the Supreme Court recorded the finding that there was nothing on record to show that the blood stains that were present on the weapons, matched the blood of the deceased. The Forensic Sciences Laboratory report only stated that the weapons contained blood stains.

The Supreme Court observed the divergence of judicial decisions in this regard. A Constitution Bench in Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (1963) had held that it would be far-fetched to conclude that blood-stained earth was stained with human blood that was of the victims. In Kansa Behra v. State of Orissa (1987) this court acquitted the appellant on the ground that the serologist report did not connect the blood found on the clothes of the appellant to that of the deceased. In Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab (1989), the acquittal was based on the blood group not matching. Similarly, cases of Raghunath, Ramkishan & Ors. v. State of Haryana (2003) and Sattaiya v. State of Maharashtra (2008) were also considered.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court had also held that in State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram &Ors. (1999) after referring to the Constitution bench judgment in Raghav Prapanna, had held that a serologist may fail to deduct the origin of the blood and that the effort of the criminal court should not be to prowl for imaginative doubts which should be of a reasonable dimension. This decision was followed subsequently in Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2001) and in Prabhu Dayal v. State of Rajasthan (2018). Further, in Sunil Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab (2012) the Supreme Court concluded that once a recovery is made in pursuance of a disclosure statement made by the accused, the matching or non-matching of blood groups loses significance.

The Supreme Court finally relied on the judgment in Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh (2019) which held that there could not be any fixed formula that prosecution has to prove the matching of blood groups, but the judicial conscience should be satisfied both about the recovery and the origin of human blood.

A sham investigation

The bias of the IO to favour the accused in the FIR who were named by Sahodra Bai, is also evident as on the first day of the investigation he had recorded the statements of several witnesses including them. Therefore, the pre-determination that the informant, her husband and her brother were culprits was manifest.

The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the IO did not proceed with the intention of unearthing the truth for extraneous considerations and the investigation was designed to turn the informant and her family members as accused to allow the real culprits named in the FIR to escape. The investigation was started in the morning after the FIR was registered at 11:50 the night before. Further, it opined that the investigation should start with the named accused. However, the investigation from the beginning made the informant, namely Sahodra Bai, her husband and brother as accused instead of the named accused in
the FIR.

The Court noted that the investigating officer had concluded that the abrasions on the back of Raju, ‘must’ have been caused during the scuffle that the deceased had with him. This was based on the medical examination which done two days later on 15th. Thereafter, on 16th, i.e. three days later, the police arrested the three persons. In effect the persons named as accused in the FIR were made witnesses for the prosecution, and after 18 days the statement of the so-called star witness was recorded by the police.

The Supreme Court opines that while it is true that for creation of an alibi, the perpetrators often lodge the FIR themselves, however even in those cases the investigation would normally proceed first against the named accused before turning the needle of suspicion against the informant.

In this regard it referred to the case of Kari Choudhari v. Mst. Sita Devi and Ors. (2002) where the Supreme Court held that the police can continue to investigate and reach a final conclusion regarding the real culprit. In this case, the informant was the mother-in-law who had registered an FIR in the death of her daughter in law and it was found that it was actually the murder was committed in pursuance to a conspiracy between the informant and other daughter in laws. It was also held that “Of course the legal position is that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them…”

The Supreme Court noted that in case the real culprit lodges the first information to misdirect the investigation, it is only during the course of the investigation, the case may take a U-turn. In those cases, additional charges against the informant under Chapter XI of IPC have to be added. In this case the informant was also charged with Sections 194 and 211 of the IPC, but the trial court had acquitted her.

The Court also held that it was unbelievable that in the presence of witness, the person who killed the deceased took him to the hospital in an autorickshaw. Barring intelligent and seasoned criminals, the normal human behavior would be to either flee or surrender.

Political pressure

The defence taken by the accused was that due to political influence, they were made accused. The Court also noted that as per the admission of the IO, there were political demonstrations when he took up the investigation. Further, the IO also stated that he was unaware if the persons originally named in the FIR were in custody or not, and yet did not effectuate their arrest subsequently. He did not explain why he did not suspect the two original named accused. Apart from the mention of this factor by the star witness mentioned above, the aspect of political pressure to implicate the informant and the other accused persons is also born out by the statement of IO who admitted that he had received verbal orders from his superiors to implead the accused named in the FIR as witness instead of accused.

Duty of a Court to ensure a fair trial and render complete justice

The Supreme Court opined that the accused were represented by amicus curiae either due to their inability to engage a counsel or non-appearance of the counsel engaged by them. Hence, it can be said that the accused did not receive the best of legal assistance, and in such cases, there is a heavy burden on the Court which the Trial Court and the High Court had not discharged.

The Supreme Court further observed that though Raju was not an appellant before the Court, he could not be denied the benefit of acquittal on the ground of technicality as the case is not based on the individual overt acts of the other two appellants, hence under Article 142, it exercised its power to acquit him also.

Conclusion

This case is demonstrative of the fact that the Courts at times overlook glaring inconsistencies in investigation. Investigation is the prerogative of the executive, however, its oversight by the judiciary is a necessary aspect of our criminal justice system.

The Supreme Court on Friday stayed the FIRs registered against Tarak Mehta Ka Ulta Chashma actor Munmun Dutta for her alleged remarks hurting sentiments of Scheduled Caste communities in a video going viral on social media.

A Division Bench of Justice Hemant Gupta and Justice V. Ramasubramanian issued a notice in a plea filed by Dutta against the FIR under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The petition has been filed by Dutta, seeking stay on the FIRs registered against her while clubbing and consolidating the FIRs registered in various states.

Senior Advocate Puneet Bali, appearing for Dutta, submitted that the incident has taken place as Dutta is Bengali and was unaware of the real meaning of the word. Whereas, the Bench contended, “That is not true. You may not be informed. Everyone knows the meaning. The same word is used in Bangla.”

However, Bali stated, “She is agreeing that she said it, but the context was different. I can show the video. There is only one relief that this Court can grant me and the High Court cannot. Similar reliefs have been granted in matters of Amish Patel etc.”

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The Bench, while issuing a notice in the petition, directed a stay on five FIRs registered against her in different states. The court has listed the matter after six weeks.

The Supreme Court refused to give any relief to disgruntled sons who have challenged the order of Madras High Court for initiation of contempt proceedings against them as they have not vacated their father’s property as directed by the court of V Metropolitan Magistrate, Chennai, within a stipulated period.

The bench of Justice Hemant Gupta and Justice V. Ramasubramanian has disposed of the matter after hearing it at length, on the undertaking given by sons that they will vacate the property on or before June 17, 2021. The Court refused to grant them any protection from arrest. As per the Madras High Court order dated June 4, 2021, the clear directions were passed to initiate contempt proceedings against them. “In the ultimate analysis, we are of the opinion that the respondents are guilty under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and accordingly, they are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and pay a fine of Rs 2000 each, in default thereof, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one week,” noted the Madras High Court in its order.

The Apex Court in its order dated June 11, 2021, had noted the submission made by counsel for the petitioner who had sought time till June 13, 2021, to vacate the said premises and was asked to file compliance affidavit on June 14, 2021.

During the hearing of the matter today i.e. June 15, 2021, the Counsel Anup Kumar, appearing for Petitioner stated that – “Sunday (June 14, 2021) was complete lockdown”.

Bench submitted that –“ You could have vacated it, we will now dismiss this application.”

Petitioner – “We will try to vacate within 15 days. Kindly see the Government Order.”

Bench- “You can’t misbehave with your father, you can’t say such things, we have already heard you.” We are dismissing the present appeal and directing the local authorities to give the complete possession.

Petitioners – My lord, Sunday it was total lockdown, kindly give me some time, atleast 15 days.”

Advocate Krishna Mohan menon appeared on behalf of Respondent (father), submitted that it has been one and a half year.

Bench said to Petitioner that “whatever it is, we had given you direction, you were supposed to vacate, even if it was Sunday, there was Monday. Enough is enough.”

Petitioner stated that “ Kindly give me 7 days, it was impossible my lord.”

Bench submitted that “If Sunday was lockdown, you could have given it on Monday.”

At last, Bench infuriated and stated that “ We have heard you enough we are not entertaining the present appeal, you have lost chance of taking indulgence. You vacate by Thursday.”

Counsel for Petitioner submitted that “ I’ll vacate today if I get the premise. Meanwhile , kindly grant stay order of High Court. It is likelihood that Police might arrest me.”

The Respondent P.S.Murthi (their father) who is more than 87-year-old had filed contempt petition before High Court of Madras against PS Vijay and PS Suraj for wilful breach of undertaking dated 28.12.2019 given to court of V Metropolitan Magistrate, of Egmore, Chennai. The said undertaking was for vacating the house where they were living with their father, to save themselves from the criminal complaint which was filed by their old age father for the ill treatment he received by his young sons.

The Division Bench of Madras HC had observed that by non-compliance of its own undertaking given to Court of MM ,despite the fact that Murthi, father of the Petitioners consented that no further action shall be taken against them , since the Petitioners undertook to vacate from premises bearing No. K-90, Anna Nagar East, Chennai within one Month.

The Madras HC had noted, “Thus, subsequent act of deliberately backing out from the terms of the undertaking by alleged contemnors i.e. PS Vijay and PS Murali constitutes a serious interference in breach of administration of Justice and further hold stringent view that breach of undertaking given to District Court will not constitute civil contempt within meaning of Section 2(b) of Contempt of Courts Act.”

It is equally well settled that a wilful breach of an undertaking given to the Court would constitute civil contempt. In Port of Mumbai vs. Nikhil N.Gupta [(2015) 10 SCC 139], the Supreme Court observed as under:

“18.The principles relating to contempt of court are clear. The definition of “civil contempt” includes wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. Public interest requires that solemn undertakings given to a court with the intention of obtaining any benefit should not be breached wilfully. The respondents cannot be absolved of the undertaking on purely ground that the undertaking was given under misconception. The breach of solemn undertaking given to a court is a serious matter and will have to be sternly dealt with…..”

The Background of the case is that PS Murthi, father of Vijay and Suraj was allotted a plot by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board on 26.05.1972, in which, he built a two-storeyed house bearing Door No.K-90 (New No.K-4), 14th Street, Anna Nagar, Chennai 600 102. He retired 27 years ago and was peacefully living in the first floor of the said house along with his wife and his fourth son, viz., Laxmi Rajah. Apart from this house, he owns some other properties in and around Chennai.

The basic dispute actually arose on the demise of the mother of the Petitioners and after it they started demanding share in properties. The Petitioners PS Vijay and PS suraj took possession of ground floor of the house. A settlement deed was executed by Murthi in favour of his 4th Son as he was scared that the other sons might dispossess him from the said property. One of the Daughter in law of Murthi assaulted Murthi and rest 3 daughter in laws filed police complaint against their father in law i.e. Murthi.

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The Madras High Court Justice R Pongiappan had quoted phrase “How sharper than a serpent’s tooth it is to have a thankless child” by William Shakespeare- King Lear – Act 1, Scene 4, while referring to the ill treatment which was meted out to an octogenarian by his so called beloved sons.

The High Court further went on to describe that, P.S. Murthi, who is now aged 87 years, was employed in the Department of Telecommunication as a Senior Officer. He is blessed with five children, viz., Raghu (55 years), Vijay (53 years), Suraj (50 years), Laxmi Rajah (44 years) and Gokul (40 years). However, he is not lucky like King Pandu, father of the Pancha Pandavas, in that, after the death of his wife in 2011, his life became miserable on account of his sons.

The Supreme Court expressed its concerns over the impersonation of sureties and issued a notice to the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) to find out the solution of verification by the judicial officers for its authentication as part of good governance.

The bench of Justice Hemant Gupta and Justice V. Ramasubramanian observed, “The problem of impersonation of sureties is rampant in some states. We understand that there is a surety module software prepared by National Informatics Center in the Case Information Module for the Sub-ordinate Courts in India. But there is still no mechanism with the courts to verify the genuineness of the surety.”

The observation was made by the bench while considering the bail plea of an advocate, Rajesh Kumar Rathore, in connection with the offence of instructing one to appear as fake surety in order to procure release of a vehicle by way of interim custody.

An FIR was registered against Advocate Rajesh Kumar Rathore under section FIR under Sections 120 (B)/34, 193 (Punishment for false evidence in a judicial proceeding), 419 (cheating by personation), 420 (cheating and inducing delivery of property), 468 (forgery of a document or electronic record for the purpose of cheating) of IPC.

Thereafter, Advocate Rathore approached Chhattisgarh High Court for bail which was rejected in April 2021, following which he approached Apex Court against the order of Chhattisgarh High Court.

The Court observed that they do not find any reason to entertain the present Special Leave Petition but they gave liberty to the petitioner to renew his request for bail after the framing of charges.

The bench also directed that the learned trial Court shall decide the application on merits in accordance with law.

While dealing with the case the bench highlighted the problem of impersonation of sureties which has become rampant in some states. The bench said, “We understand that there is a surety module software prepared by National Informatics Center in the Case Information Module for the Sub-ordinate Courts in India. But there is still no mechanism with the courts to verify the genuineness of the surety.”

Thereafter, the bench deemed it appropriate to issue notice to the Central Government and to the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) to find out the possibility of a mechanism for verification of the surety by the judicial officers for its authentication as part of good governance.

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“The desirability of issuing notice to the States and Union Territories shall be decided on the basis of response from the Union/ UIDAI”, the bench said in the order.

In the last paragraph of the order the bench noted that, “The matter regarding verification of the surety be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for constitution of an appropriate bench as deemed appropriate.

ILNS: The Supreme Court on Monday directed the Central Government to hold a meeting with the engineer, who has sought a direction for installing a fail-safe mechanism, the Engineered Material Arresting System (EMAS), designed to stop aircraft from overshooting runways.

The bench of Chief Justice S.A. Bobde, Justice A.S. Bopanna and Justice V. Ramasubramanian said, “We have to do something about this. This is extremely dangerous for passengers.”

The petition, filed by Rajen Mehta, an 85-year-old mechanical engineer, through Advocate Shohit Chaudhry sought the installation of EMAS at vulnerable airports, including those at Mangaluru and Kozhikode, alleging that despite the Mangaluru crash in 2010, the Centre deliberately omitted installing EMAS at these airports.

The EMAS technology aims to lower the severity of consequences of runway excursion and is accepted internationally. It is an arrestor bed, which uses crushable material placed at the end of a runway to stop an aircraft that overruns the runway. It stops/arrests aircraft going at a speed of 70 knots (almost 130 kmph) or less.

Chief Justice Bobde asked Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati, appearing for the Centre, “Why don’t you answer the issues, rather than raising objections? This is in respect of our own safety.”

“There are reports, which reflect immense danger at the concerned airports. Have you read the counter, what do you say about the expert committee’s suggestions?” the CJI further asked.

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Chaudhry said the Centre has not appreciated the correct facts. However, the bench asked the Centre to write to Rajen Mehta and discuss the issue with him within two months.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta on Thursday informed the Supreme Court that the Union Cabinet has approved the re-promulgation of an ordinance on the air quality management in the National Capital Region and adjoining states. The same will be presented before the court on April 19, 2021.

A three-judge bench of Chief Justice S.A. Bobde, Justice A.S. Bopanna, Justice V. Ramasubramanian was hearing the matter through video conferencing. The plea was filed by environmental activist and Class 12 student Aditya Dubey and law student Aman Banka, who sought directions to provide free-of-cost stubble removing machines to small and marginal farmers to check high particulate matter in the air.

On October 29, 2020, the Apex Court was informed by the Solicitor General that the Union of India has proposed a legislation to tackle the problem which is highlighted in the PIL and that it will be placed before the Court. Considering the statement made by the SG, the Top Court had put its previous order dated October 16, 2020, in abeyance, by which it had appointed a committee to be headed by Justice Madan B. Lokur to monitor/prevent stubble burning in Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Punjab.

India Legal had also published an article on its website on October 29, 2020, about the ordinance signed by President Ram Nath Kovind to tackle air pollution and to monitor and improve the air quality in the Delhi/NCR region. The commission for Air Quality Management in National Capital Region and Adjoining Areas Ordinance, 2020, provides for the setting up of an 18-member commission for Air Quality Management in the NCR and its adjoining areas.

However, the ordinance promulgated in October lapsed last month as the Centre could not bring the required bill to replace it due to curtailment of the Budget session.

The executive order passed in this regard provides for setting up a permanent commission for air quality management in Delhi-NCR for coordination, research, identification and resolution of problems concerning air quality.

The order said, “Due to the absence of an inter-sectorial, public participative, multi-state dynamic body, the honourable Supreme Court has been monitoring, supervising and guiding the problem of air pollution in the National Capital Region through the continuing mandamus in the case of M.C. Mehta Vs Union of India and others. The top court, therefore, had to devote its precious time in constituting various ad-hoc or permanent committees at various stages to oversee the problem of air pollution in the NCR region. In order to provide a permanent solution, and establish a self-regulated democratically monitored mechanism to curb air pollution, it is deemed fit to set up a Commission for Air Quality Management in National Capital Region and adjoining areas.”

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The commission will also have the authority to slap fines and will be responsible for laying down parameters to curb emissions and keep air quality under control. The commission will specifically monitor the measures taken by states to prevent factors causing air pollution like stubble burning, industrial emissions, road dust, vehicular pollution and other major sources, it said.

The Supreme Court has issued notice to the states of Punjab, Haryana and the Bhakra Beas Management Board (BBMS) on a plea of the Delhi Jal Board against the proposal to cut off 25 percent water supply to Delhi. The bench of Chief Justice S.A. Bobde, Justice A.S. Bopanna and Justice V. Ramasubramanian directed Haryana and Punjab to maintain the status quo till March 26.

The Delhi Jal Board counsel made the complaint to the court that there is a 25 percent curtailment of their part of water supply. The counsel submitted that construction work is going on at the Bhakra Nangal Dam and prayed to the court that it should direct the Punjab government to stop the work.

To this, the Bhakra Beas Management Board replied that construction work is going on to repair channels that led to the disruption in water supply.

The DJB counsel made the allegation on the Haryana government that they are being supplied water which is 25 percent less than what was agreed. And, if the court pleases it can send the Court Commissioner to inspect the situation in Haryana.

To which CJI Bobde said, “Since it is about fundamental right to have water, we will appoint a court commissioner if a necessity will arise.” Besides other arguments, the DJB alleged that the level of ammonia is very high in water which is being supplied to Delhi.

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Haryana government counsel submitted that all the allegations levelled by the Delhi Jal Board are wrong and they are supplying sufficient water to Delhi. The bench held that this matter is of great urgency and adjourned the hearing till March 26.